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 1 
Introduction 
 
         It is not an easy task for social scientists to approach the Balkans. No matter 
whether economic policies, Euro-integration, environmental issues or even the gender 
perspective are to be explored, the Balkans are Universe of their own. Having in mind 
their turbulent history and recent political development, it is just not plausible to 
translate automatically global economic processes to the Balkan ‘environment’. We 
need to analyze how the ‘neo-liberal global world’ is reflected in the Balkan 
‘democracies of poverty’1 and to explore if not only there is a possibility for some of 
them to transform into ‘democracies of prosperity’ but also how this can be achieved.  
The signing of the EU accession treaty on 25 April 2005 virtually paves the way for 
Bulgaria and Romania’s full-fledged EU membership. After that date, it is just a 
matter of technical time until the actual accession date of 1st Jan 2007. However, the 
perspective for the West Balkans is still quite harsh. The project’s aim is to look 
beyond the journalistic flash stories and the repetitive high pathos analysis and 
explore in depth the geopolitical implications of such an important development. In 
other words, this thesis looks at two major questions, and namely, what are the 
geopolitical and geo-economic consequences for the Balkans, arising from 
Bulgaria and Romania’s accession to the EU and in a broader context what are the 
geo-economic and geopolitical changes that are shaping in the Balkans in the first 
decade of the 21st century? To answer these broader questions I first concentrate on 
answering series of other closely related, but more narrowly focused questions, 
namely: 
 
How the EU policies of inclusion and exclusion in the Balkans could contribute to severe 
economic, political and cultural ghettoization of the Balkans in short to mid term perspective?  
 
What are the Geo-economic and Geopolitical Perspectives for the integrated Eastern 
component? (Bulgaria and Romania) 
 
Pathways from the West Periphery or Western Periphery Paths: Options for the Excluded 
Component? (Bosnia& Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia & Montenegro, Macedonia) 
                                                          
1Peter Stoyanov, President of Bulgaria, International Conference ‘Nation building vs. State building. 
Lessons learned’, CEU, 30thNov-1st Dec,2002 
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Are we currently observing grandeur changes and the emergence of Bulgaria and Romania as a 
region with a new very important geopolitical value due to the concurrence of major developments?  
 
          How can these two countries capitalize on their advanced Euro-Atlantic integration stage and 
lobby for a more engaged EU policy towards the whole region and specifically the West Balkans? 
 
           The first section of the first chapter gives the historical framework of Balkan 
economic relations and the evolution from historical confrontation to cooperation. In 
the next section I explore the recent geopolitical developments and namely the 
emerging East-West split , running through the heart of the Balkan peninsula, with its 
east part in the final stages of EU integration (Bulgaria and Romania) and the ‘Wild 
West’ of the Balkans with no prospective of mid to long-term EU integration. 
     The second chapter explores the geo-economic implications of Bulgaria and 
Romania’s EU accession for the region. The first section of the second chapter 
focuses on ‘the East included’ component, and comprehensively analyses pre-
accession Bulgaria and Romania’s economic development. By exploring major 
macroeconomic indicators, other economic developments and trends, structural 
factors and competitive advantages the chapter looks at most recent record-high 
expansionary economic boom tendencies in the ‘included’ Balkan economies 
(Bulgaria, Romania), evidenced by all major macroeconomic indicators. For example, 
GDP growth for Bulgaria and Romania in 2004 was 6 and 8 % respectively and both 
countries alone received between 75 to 80 % of all the investment in Southeastern 
Europe and between 30 and 40 % of all the investment in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Record GDP growth, record FDI, attractive labor costs, educational benefits, 
encouragement of ICT and pharmaceutical industries, etc. are scrutinized in detail. 
Further, the implications of such expansionary boom to the two countries per se are 
explored and how this relates to Central European Countries (CEC 4) on one hand, 
and excluded countries of the Balkan West, on the other. I believe this chapter would 
be very innovative, as it would summarize otherwise very scattered and partial 
information for a process which should not be overlooked. Namely, somehow 
unnoticed in the last five years, Bulgarian and Romanian economies outperformed 
CEC-4 economies in terms of macroeconomic performance and expansionary growth 
and the tendency is very well pronounced and more and more strengthening. 
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Moreover, the political divide between the ‘East’ and ‘West’ Balkans is more and 
more translating into economic divide. Different geo-political developments within 
the two ‘camps’ have already started to yield enormous economic differences and this 
is especially pronounced in the last five years. The second section of the second 
chapter explores the excluded Balkan countries, which might transform into economic 
ghettoes, ‘gray zones’ of ‘non-states’ and ‘states of sovereign exception’, using Aida 
Hozic’s terminology, if such a policy of isolation is not discontinued in short to mid-
term perspective. 
     The third chapter explores the major geo-political changes that are currently 
shaping the Balkans and more narrowly the geo-political implications of Bulgaria and 
Romania’s EU accession to the region. The collapse of the Soviet geopolitical system 
at the end of the twentieth century initiated radical geopolitical transformation 
processes in vast regions of Europe and Asia. The geopolitical vacuum was filled by, 
using Loukas’s terminology2, formation of three new spatial ‘geo-systems’ on the 
territory of the former Soviet Union: Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia.3 
Similarly the former communist space, outside of the Soviet Union formed two spatial 
‘geo-systems’, namely, the Central European (Visegrad) and the Balkan geo-system.4 
Two of these new geo-systems, the Caucasus and Central Asia are especially rich in 
oil and gas reserves. However, the vast deposits of the Caspian Basin are landlocked 
and have to be transported across borders. Due to the fact that most of this assets are 
in areas or countries, adjacent or even part of plethora of ethnic, political, economic, 
etc conflicts,  finding ‘a safe transportation passage’ to Western markets becomes a 
geopolitical asset, equal to the oil and gas  per se.  Standing on major crossroads, the 
Balkan geo-system acquires a new role of paramount geopolitical and geo-economic 
significance and specifically for the EU’s energy security policy. No matter the region 
does not have strategic reserves of its own, its emerging geo-strategic and geo-
economic power ‘resides in its geographical location, halfway between two major oil 
and gas supply regions - Russia and the Caspian - and large markets, such as Turkey, 
Southeast and Central Europe, and the Mediterranean.’ The chapter explores in detail 
                                                          
2 Ioannis Loukas,The New Geopolitics of Europe, Analysis-S43, Naval Academy, UK Ministry of Defense
  
3 Ibid.,
 
8.
 
4 Croatia and especially Slovenia are also often considered as Central European countries
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the planned Balkan oil pipelines and the competition between the three major 
competitors: Burgas-Vlore, Burgas –Alexandroupolis and Constanta-Trieste projects. 
The oil section is followed by ‘geopolitics of gas’ analysis, and deals mainly 
with the so called Nabucco project.  The pipeline will transport Iranian gas from the 
Middle East and the Caspian region to Western Europe, through Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Hungary to Baumgarten in Austria.  
  Following  oil and gas sections, last two sections look at the geopolitics of 
nuclear energy and geopolitics of rail and road transport.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Overview of Balkan-EU Interaction: Disparities between the 
Euro-included Component (Bulgaria and Romania) and the 
Wild West (excluded component) of the Balkans 
 
 
 
 
           1.1 From ‘national individualism’ to multilateral cooperation 
 
           The Balkan Peninsula is the land of eleven countries. Considering the very 
favorable geographic situation, the Balkan lands are perceived as the key to three 
continents-Europe, Asia, Africa and also the Middle East. Nicholas Gianaris, who 
explores the historical and economic relations in the region, writes: 
   The geographic position of the Balkan countries, at the hub of three continents…attracts the 
competition of the big powers for political and economic influence and domination…in other 
words, the big powers quarreled over the Balkan   Peninsula, and the result was its 
socioeconomic backwardness.5 
 
This factor is described by Gianaris6 as the imperialism of other countries.  The 
second factor for the retarded economical development is the national individualism7 
of the Balkan economies. It is true that the immense geopolitical stake and the 
corresponding ‘Big Power’s interests’ in the region have hindered its economic 
performance for the last two centuries. However, I believe the biggest reason for the 
lack of cooperation in the past is to be found within the Balkan countries themselves. 
             After the culmination of the Yugoslav wars, however, the Balkan countries 
have somehow exhausted the nationalistic rhetoric and are increasingly aware of the 
need for cooperation. For the first time in their modern history, they could develop a 
common framework, bound by mutually profitable economic, environmental, cultural 
initiatives. In the today’s integrating world, it is implausible to speak for ‘the 
imperialism of other countries’. In addition, ‘the national individualism’ is dissolving 
to provide scope for multilateral cooperation. 
 
                                                          
5
 Nicholas V. Gianaris, Geopolitical and Economic Changes in the Balkan Countries Praeger 
Publishers, 1996 p157-158 
6
 Ibid.,p.160 
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        1.2 The Emerging Economic and Political Ghettoization of the Balkans:  the 
‘Good East’ vs. the ‘Wild West’  
 
           This unique favorable situation for the Balkan countries could however be 
obstructed by the European Union’s policies of inclusion and exclusion. It imposes 
double standards on Balkan governments by including some states -Bulgaria and 
Romania for example in the short-run round of expansion of the EU and excluding 
others-Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia, Albania. While Bulgarian and 
Romanian governments are encouraged by the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 
to build cooperative networks with all Balkan countries in the economy, ecology and 
other areas, on the other hand they have to impose visa regimes for the citizens of all 
the ‘excluded countries’ (taking effect from 1st Jan, 2007 at latest). Moreover, the 
selection of some countries will build mental borders that will hinder economic 
cooperation. As Simona Zimic8 implies, the Schengen border is very likely to become 
the demarcation line dividing the Balkans into the ‘European’ and ‘non-European 
part’. It is already clearly visible that Bulgaria and Romania will constitute the 
‘European part’ (integrated part), linked to Greece and Hungary respectively. 
However the perspective for the ‘Western Balkans’ (with some exceptions) is much 
harsher. They face the prospect to be the non-European, non-integrated component at 
least in the short and mid-term perspectives. Thus, we will observe the appearance of 
new ghettoes in the Balkan context. 
           For long decades Balkans were perceived as a synonym for economic 
backwardness. However, the recent very positive macroeconomic indicators of 
Bulgaria and Romania (explored in detail below) as well as the relative Greek 
economic success significantly challenge the old stereotypes and indicate that a 
success story might be possible in the Balkans. Relying on outdated sources quite 
superficially, Bjorn Hettne in ‘Comparing Regionalisms’9 defines the whole Balkan 
Peninsula as a periphery region. Although his general framework of the relations of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7
 Ibid.,p160 
8
 Simona Zimic, Constructing New Boundaries: Perspective of ‘Schengen periphery’, International 
Conference ‘Nation building vs. State building. Lessons learned’, CEU, 30thNov-1st Dec,2002 
9
 Bjorn Hettne,  (ed.), Inotai, A. (ed.), Sunkel, O. (ed.); Comparing Regionalisms; PALGRAVE, 2001 
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core-intermediate-periphery regions is consistent and coherent, I believe his theory is 
seriously lacking some insights when it comes to ‘fitting the exact countries’ in the 
right definition. For example, he defines coreness according to two major criteria-
political stability and their relative degree of sustained economic dynamics. I argue in 
my paper that according to his criteria, the included Balkan component is definitely 
an intermediate region with a chance to join the core in the long-term perspective, and 
it is implausible to define the whole region as a periphery. However, it is true that 
marginalization might be the fate of the excluded Balkan countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Geo-economic Implications for the Balkans of Bulgaria and 
Romania’s Accession to the EU 
 
 
2.1 Go East 
 
 8 
 
Fig.1 ‘Included’ and ‘Excluded’ Balkan Component 
 
           What is important for this research is the economic model of development 
these two Balkan ‘camps’ will adopt. For the integrated component (Bulgaria and 
Romania), upon entering the European Union, indigenous protective legislation, 
import and export quotas, manipulation of prices, exchange rates, trade barriers, direct 
cash subsidies will all be excluded from the available tools for macroeconomic policy. 
I argue that under these conditions, the only possible successful model for the 
European included Balkan states is a neoliberal state, specifically using Evans’ 
typology that is a flexible developmental state, which ‘intervenes in more localized 
and flexible ways that are suited to competitive conditions such as information 
technologies.’10 In the current chapter, the macroeconomic indicators that could be 
the prerequisites for the adoption and success of this model will be explored. 
Moreover the paper would not only speculate about the possible economic model 
which Bulgaria and Romania would follow after their EU accession, but will also 
explore the recent expansionary economic boom of the latter countries, evidenced by 
record high GDP growth rates, record amount of attracted foreign direct investments, 
low inflation, record low public debt/GDP ratio, etc. The analysis would be further 
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enhanced by comparing major macroeconomic indicators of Bulgaria and Romania 
with that of the four Central European countries (CEC-4), or the so-called Visegrad 
countries for the period 2000-2005. Such analysis would mainly seek to find the 
reasons why Bulgaria and Romania are experiencing such a robust expansionary 
economic growth in the last five years (and especially last two years), and why the 
former showcase economies of CEC-4 are in a relative slowdown. Such a 
development is more than welcome for the two Balkan economies as this could lead 
to a convergence and catching-up of the latter with CEC-4’s economies in mid-term 
perspective. However, in the Balkans, situation is much different, and namely, such a 
rapid and expansive growth of the EU-included Balkan component (Bulgaria and 
Romania) would create enormous discrepancies between the economic development 
of the latter and the excluded ‘economic ghettoes’ of the West Balkans. 
            I believe that this paper is a pioneer research, that summarizes otherwise very 
scattered and partial information for a process which should not be overlooked, and 
namely that somehow unnoticed Bulgarian and Romanian economies outperformed 
CEC-4 economies in terms of macroeconomic performance and expansionary growth 
and the tendency is very well pronounced and more and more strengthening. 
Moreover, it would not be an overstatement to claim that gradually the two Balkan 
countries are started to be regarded as regional economic powers. This is justified by 
numerous articles and publications in Western press and journals, as well as in the 
perception of the neighbors towards Bulgaria and Romania.  
            After late but successful reforms in these countries, by the end of the last 
decade, a record high GDP growth and FDI were already observed. These tendencies 
strengthened and intensified during the following years. /2000-2005/ Together with 
very attractive labor costs, favorable educational structure and strong tradition in High 
Technologies, these factors could lead to a successful and sustainable development. 
Why not even to a ‘Balkan tiger’? In order to compare the emerging positive 
economic development in the Balkans, we need to compare it with the first success 
stories that appeared from the former communist economies, and namely that of the 
Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia). By exploring 
                                                                                                                                                                      
10
 Denis O’Hearn, Globalization,’New tigers’, and the end of Developmental State? The case of the 
Celtic tiger, Politics&Society, vol.28 N1, 2000 
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briefly their success, we observe if their model is applicable to the ‘Integrated Balkan 
component’- the European Union aspirants Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
          2.1.1 The Visegrad Model: Some Macroeconomic Comparisons 
 
           After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Trans-National Corporations /TNCs/ 
‘discovered’ the ‘labor cost paradises’ of the Visegrad countries. After the quick 
liberalization of economic activity, foreign trade, prices, foreign investments the 
Visegrad countries soon became ‘the most important backyard of EU-based 
multinational companies’.11 The cumulated FDI in Poland, Czech Republic and 
Hungary in the year 2000 were more than 82 billion dollars. The liberalization was 
combined with the creation of a very favorable legal framework. Most important these 
states subsidized large-scale investment in high technology sectors such as 
automotive, electronics, biotechnology and communications. This policy was 
expanded with the subsidies going to domestic companies as well.12 Nevertheless, this 
policy of cash subsidies had to be discontinued, as it did not conform to the EU 
regulations and the accession of these countries to the union. (For example Hungary 
had already reformed its tax-subsidization policy in compliance with EU in effect 
from 31 Dec, 200213, which  led to a new tendency of flight of capital further East and 
the Balkans are a good example for a new ‘hot place’.) Another obstacle that the EU 
imposes to new member countries is the policy and general attitude against free trade 
zones, which were the main FDI spot in these countries, especially in Hungary. It was 
not a secret that although the EU was not openly against free zones, it was definitely 
not in favor. The Visegrad countries would have to increasingly count, according to 
Peter Evans’s terminology to ‘midwifery’ strategies and to abandon their ‘husbandry’ 
initiatives, such as subsidies for local entrepreneurs. Thus, the Euro integration 
perspective for new member nations eliminated all models for economic development 
but the neo-liberal. 
 
                                                          
11FDI-related policies in Hungary 1990-2001 http://cuts.org/ifd-lm-cr-hun.doc, last accessed 
5Dec,2004 
12
 Ibid. Foreign Investment Policy 
13
 Kinga Szuly, Presentation on ‘Hungary’s integration to the European Union’, CEU, 12Dec,2002 
 11 
           2.1.2 Adopting aspects of the ‘Visegrad model’ in the Balkans 
 
          The Visegrad countries are already experiencing some negative economic 
effects, arising from their EU integration. One the other hand, in the Balkans-Bulgaria 
and Romania, who have a perspective of a later accession into the EU (1st Jan 2007 or 
2008), we can already observe the first tendencies of catching up with Visegrad 
countries and adopting most of the successful aspects of the latter’s economic models 
from the early 90’s. How this competitive development was accomplished and what 
are the factors that indicate a success story emerging on the Balkans in mid or long-
term perspective? 
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           2.1.3 Bulgaria and Romania: Record growth of GDP after 2000 
 
           After a protracted and simulated-economic-reforms-transition in the early 
nineties, by the end of the decade /1997-2000/, owing to the new reformist 
governments and ever-closer EU accession perspective, the business and 
macroeconomic climate had improved considerably. This led to significant 
improvement nearly all major macroeconomic indicators, and most notably of 
significant foreign direct investments growth and record-high GDP real growth of 
5.4% for Bulgaria in 2000 and the Romanian 5.7% in 2001. In 2001 these countries 
already had the highest GDP real growth rates in comparison with the Central 
European countries, whose growth rate in the best cases of Hungary and Czech 
republic does not exceed 4%, and in the cases of Poland, Slovenia steadily declines 
and is in the range of 1-2%, which is scarcely above the level for western economies. 
The World Bank has predicted for the period 2001-2005 steady 4.8% and 4.6% 
average GDP growth for Romania and Bulgaria respectively, while for Poland the 
figure was 3.3%.14 The real record shows that the report even underestimated these 
two economies, as in the period 2001-2004 Romania grew with 5.88 % on average 
and Bulgaria with 4.75%. This would even be enhanced when the last year of the 
predicted period is included as Bulgarian and Romanian economies in 2005 are 
expected to be marked by the biggest ever-expansionary growth since the beginning 
of the transition (GDP growth for Bulgaria expected to be 6 % and Romanian 8%). 
              If we again compare the Visegrad’s countries recent economic performance 
with that of the two Balkan countries, we would once again observe the expansionary 
growth of the latter economies and the relative slowdown of the former. With precise 
figures: in the same period /2000-2003/ the weighted average growth rate in Poland 
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was 2.53%, 2.80% for Czech Republic, 3.48% for Slovakia and 3.85% for Hungary. 
However, the boom of the two Balkan countries economies and the slowdown of the 
Central European economies can be even better observed if we look at the trend by 
years. The weighted average growth rate of CEC-4 (the 4 Central European countries-
Poland, Hungary, Czech republic and Slovakia) 15 for 2000 3.67%, and for Bulgaria 
3.75%. In 2001, the discrepancy already becomes much bigger with CEC-4 weighted 
average at 2.81%, and the two Balkan countries at 4.90%, largely repeated in 2002 
with 2.81% and 4.85% respectively and 3.37% and 4.70% in 2003. The figures for 
2004 and 2005 would probably make the account even more positive for Bulgaria and 
Romania with GDP growth rates at 5.6% and 8% respectively and 6% and 8%, while 
estimates for CEC-4 estimated at 3-4% again. 
           Last year’s GDP growth in Bulgaria by 5.6 to 5.8% was achieved mainly 
‘through the expansion of the services sector, which grew by 6%’; the industry grew 
by 5.3% and agriculture by 2.2%. Similarly, Romania’s record high growth 
acceleration with 3.2 percentage points was largely through expansion of the services 
sector. 
 
           
           2.1.4 Bulgaria and Romania: Attractive Labor costs 
 
           The answer could well be yes, as the convergence of Central European 
economies with the union’s markets and the gradual equalizing labor cost effect, 
already cause flight of capital towards the Balkan states. According to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, in 2000, the hourly labor cost was 2.42 US dollars in Poland, 1.99 
in the Czech Republic, 1.91 US dollars in Poland and 1.41 in Slovakia. In Bulgaria 
and Romania, the labor cost for the same year was 0.59 and 0.56 US dollars/hour 
respectively. In 2003 the figures were already Hungary- 3.80 US dollars/hour, Czech 
Republic- 3.39, Poland-3.14, Slovakia-2.15;16 these figures have risen even more 
sharply after latter’ countries accession into the EU in 2004. At the same time in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14The World Bank Group-Ed Stats, http://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats/cg.asp,last accessed 6 
Dec,2004 
15
 Estimates of National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, www.nsi.bg, last accessed April, 2005. 
16Country briefings of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia , economic 
data, available from the Economist Intelligence Unit , available at www.economist.com, last accessed 
April, 2005; 
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Bulgaria and Romania, the figures for 2003 were 0.91 and 0.80 dollars/hour. Since 
2003, there is a clear-cut tendency of the latter two countries starting to catch up with 
the Visegrad countries’ labor costs, but still the differences are significant and 
convergence is probably not a short-term perspective. Even more such a catching-up 
tendency could be neutralized and reversed again by the Central European countries’ 
already completed EU-accession and the implications of that process for the labor-
costs in the respective countries. 
         In aggregated terms the Visegrad countries’ average labor cost for the period 
2000-2003  was 2.44 dollars/hour and for Bulgaria and Romania 0.68 dollars/hour, 
which means 3,59 times bigger attractiveness of the latter countries’ labor cost for the 
TNC’s and foreign investors. By years the indicators are 3.33 bigger attractiveness of 
Bulgarian and Romanian’ labor costs in 2000, 3.60 in 2001, 3.98 in 2002 and 3.63 in 
2003.  
         The labor costs as a factor for attracting FDI could be expected to attract more 
and more greenfield investments into these economies in short run perspective and the 
tendency of major share of the FDI in Eastern Europe to be gradually but surely 
redirected from Central Europe (Visegrad countries) towards South-eastern Europe 
and specifically in Bulgaria and Romania as the frontrunners of the region. Such 
theoretical prediction is largely supported by the FDI data for Central and 
Southeastern Europe and the record amount of foreign investment in Romania and 
Bulgaria in the last years, with Bulgaria in 2004 even receiving the largest FDI in 
Central and Eastern Europe in terms of percentage of gross domestic product, which 
stood at 9.2 percent. According to the Bulgarian National Bank, the country 
accounted for 10 percent of the overall FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, and 30 
percent of investment in the Southeastern Europe.´17 
 
 
         2.1.5 Bulgaria and Romania: Foreign Direct Investments 
 
        Can we assume that after Central Europe’s full integration with the EU, the new 
‘hot places’ for FDI are shifting further east towards Bulgaria and Romania? Are 
                                                          
17
 Southeastern Europe Business Brief, Volume 10.10, March 11, 2005, available at 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/ceebic/balkan/SEEBB/1010.htm, last accessed April, 2005. 
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these countries already the new favorites for TNCs? Here should be added that the 
Balkan countries still can use their national tax-subsidizing policies, which is not the 
case with the Visegrad countries, because of their EU-membership status.  
         In the last ten to fifteen years Bulgaria and Romania have been lagging behind 
the eight newly accepted Central and East European countries in attracting Foreign 
direct investment(FDI) with FDI per capita standing at 1100 euros/1420 dollars/ in 
Bulgaria and 700 euros in Romania, ‘compared with average of 2200 euros for the 
CEE-8.’(Eight Central and East European countries that joined the EU last year)18 
However the now very close EU accession perspective and the cheap educated labor 
has significantly contributed to a very recent but clearly emerging trend in the rapid 
increase or even boom of FDI in the two Balkan countries in the last couple of years. 
As a support of that, ‘Bulgaria has brought in nearly $4.5 billion in FDI over the last 3 
years, which is a 50% increase over the period 1997-2001.’19  For 2004, Bulgaria and 
Romania alone received between 75 to 80 % of all the investment in Southeastern 
Europe and between 30 and 40 % of all the investment in Central and Eastern 
Europe.20 In figures that is projected by 2.6 billion US dollars of FDI for Bulgaria and   
for Romania. Even if we account that this could be partly explained by the relatively 
large population of Romania and some last year’s ‘big-ticket privatizations of 
important assets’  and similar large ‘utility privatizations’ in Bulgaria, the increase is 
still very significant to be simply disregarded or overlooked.21 However, the analysis 
underlines that despite these very positive trends, foreign investors still have 
significant obstacles in doing business with Bulgaria and Romania and namely –
insecure environment, corporate governance, judicial inefficiency and xenophobia 
and if the latter countries would like to be competitive to CEE-8, they have to tackle 
first this problems. 
             Following the positive trend last year, in 2005 Bulgaria is expected to ´match, 
if not exceed last year’s $2.6 billion record investment level. The energy sector was 
the biggest benefactor garnering 38 percent of the foreign investment that came into 
Bulgaria, as seven electricity distribution companies were sold.  Energy, 
                                                          
18
 Bulgaria Leads the Way in Attracting FDI in Southeast Europe, www.seeurope.net  -News Coverage 
on Eastern Europe, available at http://www.seeurope.net/en/Story.php?StoryID=55105&LangID=1, 
last accessed April, 2005. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
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telecommunications, and real estate are expected to be the leading sectors this year.  
Energy is expected to be the leading sector as a new coal-powered plant project has 
been approved for the U.S. Company, AES Corp.´22 
             An Oxford Analytica analysis explores that Bulgaria and Romania have 
missed ‘the first big wave of foreign investment in to CEE’, due to ‘instability of the 
Balkans in the 1990s and the election of governments less committed to economic 
reforms’. However the analysis predicts that Bulgaria and Romania are very well 
positioned for the ‘consequent waves of foreign investment’ as the ‘character of CEE 
FDI has changed over time, with investors increasingly looking for good skills bases 
suitable for higher value-added manufacturing, and information and communications 
technology (ICT) enterprises.’23  Although the two countries vary accordingly to what 
they can offer to prospective investors, they are the countries that are the most 
corresponding to the type of new investors’ demands. For instance, the Oxford 
Analytica analysis states that Bulgaria has competitive advantages attracting investors 
with highly skilled workforces at cheap rates and furthermore ‘the country has a high 
reputation for training mathematicians and linguists, making it a good base for ICT, 
particularly customized software development, design of internet solutions and 
applications, wireless application development, security solutions development, web 
design and CAD/CAM/CAE software.’ The analysis also concludes that Bulgaria 
‘also appears to be developing strength in such high value-added sectors as 
sophisticated electronic automobile components, following to a large extent the 
pattern of FDI in Hungary , which proved critical to Hungary’s economic success in 
the late 1990s.’24 
          Romania, on the other hand has largely attracted FDIs mainly in ‘low-value 
outward processing sectors as textiles.’25 However recently the government is seeking 
to attract FDIs in more high-tech sectors and as the following sub-chapter would 
argue Romania has the competitive advantage to do so, and namely the ‘magic 
formula of Bulgaria’-very skilled workforces at cheap prices.  
 
                                                          
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
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           2.1.6 Bulgaria and Romania: Educational benefits 
 
           As the latter part of this successful formula (‘at cheap prices’) was thoroughly 
explored in the labor costs sub-chapter, the present explores the former part 
(‘skilled’), and namely the fact that this relatively cheap labor is highly educated, 
skilled, and computer literate. Until 1990 under the Council for Mutual Economic 
Cooperation/COMECON/ Bulgaria was the only country in Eastern Europe that 
specialized in High Technologies and Romania in engineering and electronics26. The 
two communist states had educated thousands of engineers, large number of whom is 
still available to their economies, though many fled to Ireland, Germany, Czech 
Republic and the USA. The Global IT IQ Report of March 2002 of Brainbench Inc. 
ranks Romania and Bulgaria at 6th and 8th place among the top 10 countries in the 
world as to the number of certified IT professionals –16 122 and 8,844 specialists 
respectively. (1st and 3rd place in Europe). Bulgaria's secondary education is among 
the best in the world: fifth in the world in sciences, 11th in mathematics (according to 
the World Bank and The Economist ranking).  Bulgarians rank second in international 
IQ tests, held by MENSA International and also they are among the top university 
students worldwide - second in the world in SAT scores; there are 42 Universities in 
Bulgaria, located in 26 cities and towns. Around 50% of them have computer 
specialties. Over 6,000 Bulgarian students are currently majoring in Computer 
Science.27  
            Using Bela Greskovits’ model28 and typology could be argued why this High 
Tech potential was not used to create strong leading sectors in IT and High 
Technologies? Instead Bulgaria and Romania developed small-scale sector with 
transnational patterns of control /3rd quadrant/, which is the worst prospective for 
development, because of the easy flight of capital across borders, low intersectoral 
flexibility within the country and nearly absent linkages with the rest of the economy. 
 
         2.1.7 Bulgaria and Romania: The return to High Technologies 
 
                                                          
26
 IT Sector Development in Bulgaria 2001 –2002 
http://www.saarland.ihk.de/ihk/international/vortraege/bulgarien3.pdf, last accessed 6 Dec,2004 
27
  Bulgarian foreign investment agency, www.bfia.org, last accessed 6 Dec,2004 
28
 Bela Greskovits, .Sectors, States and the Paths of Post-Socialist Development, CEU, 2002  
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          In the last two years, Bulgaria recognized the need to restore its High Tech 
Industry. The government of Bulgaria has set objective to promote investment in the 
IT sector and R&D Networks, create a competitive and export-oriented strategy, to 
encourage small and medium enterprises in the IT sector29. In the past Bulgaria was 
called the ‘Silicon Valley of Eastern Europe’, because of its strategic specialization in 
High Tech and ICT products. The traditions from the past and the government 
engagement are favorable factors for new specialization in High Technologies and 
developing them as leading sectors instead of light transnational sectors. (footwear 
and clothing). According to the National Strategy for High Technologies 
Development in Bulgaria,30 this could be achieved by indirect incentives by the 
government to improve the legal framework, optimizing the fiscal environment, 
developing the transport and telecommunication infrastructure; supporting the 
establishment of financial agencies that facilitate access to risk investment. It will also 
cover the cost for high risk R&D by providing access to equipment and laboratories, 
financing the exchange of information, international contacts, training and 
specialization of key experts in relevant areas of High Tech sectors, certification in 
compliance with international standards. 
         All these measures aim to create a favorable framework to attract TNC in the 
large-scale production facilities that generated considerable output in the High Tech 
area until 1990. This will create leading sectors in the IT and HT technologies of the 
Greskovits’ fourth quadrant type, which will secure sustainable development, because 
this specialization has low cross-border mobility, relatively large intersectoral 
flexibility and abundant linkages with the rest of the economy.31These countries are 
still in the process of privatizing their large state monopolies, which is of crucial 
importance for their future sectoral specialization and prospects for development. This 
transformation would free these states from ‘falling into development traps’32. In 
order to achieve development Bulgaria and Romania should create favorable 
                                                          
29
 IT Sector Development in Bulgaria 2001 –2002 
http://www.saarland.ihk.de/ihk/international/vortraege/bulgarien3.pdf, last accessed 6 Dec,2004 
30
 National Strategy for High Technologies Development in Bulgaria 
http://www.usaid.gov/info_technology/ied/reports/bulgaria/annexe.html#financial, last accessed 6 
Dec,2004 
31
 Bela Greskovits, .Sectors, States and the Paths of Post-Socialist Development, CEU, 2002 
32
 Ibid. Greskovits 
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condition for leading sectors in the light national sectors, which would guarantee 
sustainability. 
 
            2.1.8 World Record Rise of the Real Wage for 2003 
 
            Another tendency that indicates possible economic success emerging in the 
‘Euro-included’ Balkan economies is the increase of nominal and most importantly 
real wage. According to a report, published in Financial Times33 on 16th December 
2002, ‘Bulgarians will see the world’s highest increase in pay next year, according to 
a study of more than 60 countries by Mercer Human Resource Consulting34. It 
predicts that pay in Bulgaria will rise by almost 11 per cent above inflation. (nominal 
rise of wage is expected to be above 16 %). For comparison, the pay is expected to 
rise sharply in China, by 7 per cent above inflation, and in India, by 4.5 per cent, 
while in Western countries pay will increase only by less than 2 per cent in real terms 
in the US, the UK, Germany and France. 
 
            2.1.9 The New Geopolitical and Geo-economical Value of the Region: 
Bulgaria and Romania-the Emergence of Regional Powers? 
 
           The last couple of years have been marked by an expansionary boom in the 
economies of the two Balkan countries. This is even more pronounced when 
compared with the relative slowdown of the Central European countries’ economies. 
Since Bulgaria and Romania are experiencing record-high GDP growths, record 
inflow of foreign direct investments in diverse sectors, low inflation, record low 
public debt/GDP ratio, etc. As already argued it was nearly overlooked, but is 
becoming more and more evident that Bulgarian and Romanian economies 
outperformed CEC-4 economies in terms of macroeconomic performance and 
expansionary growth and the tendency is very well pronounced and more and more 
                                                          
33
 Financial Times. WORLD NEWS: Bulgarians top pay rise table 
http://search.ft.com/search/article.html?id=021216000506&query=bulgaria&vsc_appId=totalSearch&s
tate=Form, last updated16 Dec, 2002.  last accessed 16 Dec,2002 
 
34
 Mercer Human Resource Consulting 2003 pay increases to slightly outpace inflation in most 
countries, available at http://www.mercerhr.com/pressrelease/details.jhtml?idContent=1078165. Last 
updated 16 Dec, 2003.  last accessed 16 Dec,2003 
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strengthening. Again, it would not be an overstatement to claim that gradually the two 
Balkan countries are started to be regarded as regional economic powers. As argued, 
this is justified by numerous articles and publications in Western press and journals, 
as well as in the perception of the neighbors towards Bulgaria and Romania. For 
example the French Le Monde from 14 April, 2005 writes that we are currently 
observing grandeur changes and the  emergence of Bulgaria and Romania as a region 
with a  new very important geopolitical value due to the concurrence of major 
developments, and namely: NATO integration (2004), combined with  EU accession 
(2007), expansionary economic boom in the last half decade, relocation of couple of 
NATO military bases on the Western Black Sea coast (as the region is the closest to 
the Middle East and positioned best geographically and logistically to locate and 
counteract possible threats), two major oil pipeline projects to be commissioned from 
Asia and the Middle East to the Adriatic, through the Balkans , bypassing the 
Bosporus, the TRACECA project from Middle East to Western Europe for gas 
transportation. To which should be added that 7 out of 10 major pan-European 
transport corridors, planned for commissioning, with the support of the EU are 
passing through the Balkans. All these factors allow Le Monde to conclude –‘This 
newly-found geo-strategic value of the …region will project its influence over the 
whole of Southern Europe and as far as the Caspian Sea, where the oil projects start 
from…(the) second project for a oil pipeline, will connect Albania, Macedonia and 
Bulgaria. From this moment, Bulgaria would find itself as the geo-economic centre of 
the European Union. That country that would host both of these major projects on its 
territory, is expected to become once again a regional power , like the one it was at 
the time of the démocraties populaires of divided Europe.’35 
 
           2.1.10 Sustainable growth? 
 
          As a conclusion, the integrated Balkan component (Bulgaria, Romania) is in its 
final stage of an accession into the European Union. Their path for development is 
                                                          
35Devenue dès lors une plaque tournante géoéconomique de l'UE, la Bulgarie, par laquelle transitera 
les pipelines, s'attend à recouvrer  son rang de puissance régionale, héritage de l'époque des 
démocraties populaires d'une Europe divisée in Les enjeux de l'adhésion de la Bulgarie et de la 
Roumanie à l'Union européenne,Le Monde online from 14 April, 2005, available at 
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0,36-638781,0.html 
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traced by the predominant economic philosophy in the core, which is neoliberalism. 
That is why, I argue they will adopt a neoliberal model similar to the O’Riain’s 
flexible development state. Bulgaria and Romania are also finalizing their transition 
from political and financial stabilization to steady economic growth.  The 
governments of these countries believe that development of the ITC and HT sectors, 
along with the pharmaceuticals are key factors for achieving the sustainable economic 
dynamism and securing favorable positions in the international division of labor. 
Summarizing all the positive prerequisites as the very encouraging macroeconomic 
indicators, the geo-strategic location of these countries, and the clear determination of 
the governments for developing leading sectors in the high technologies, can be 
assumed that the neoliberal ‘flexible development’36 model can lead to sustainable 
growth.  That is the most likely option. I argue with Denis O’Hearn37 who states that 
‘the Irish option simply cannot apply to the whole European periphery’ and that it is 
impossible to achieve something similar in the aspiring European countries for 
example. I believe that a sustainable growth and a success story are possible in the 
Balkans. Why not speculate with an even more radical prospective- the ‘Celtic tiger’ c 
‘jumping’ into the Balkans. Unfortunately, that is the overestimated option. 
 
  2.2 ‘The Wild’ West 
 
           No matter which development option will take place-the optimal, or the 
overestimated, the integrated component will be included in the neoliberal global 
economy’s success stories. However, what will happen with the excluded peripheries 
as Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo, and to some extent Serbia and 
Croatia. The economy of these states today comprises of legal and much larger illegal 
section. Their territories have turned into a large depot for illicit, but most profitable 
activities. The ‘leading sectors’ of these economies, which connect them to the global 
economy, are large-scale transnational drug production, prostitution, car smuggling, 
which are traded in illegal markets. This is a specific Balkan ‘Third Way’ of 
development. The most striking fact is that this ‘failed states’ are incorporated in the 
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global system in compliance with the ‘prostitution of law’ in Palan38 and 
Mittelman’s39 terminology. For ‘global merchants’40 the unobstructed capital 
movement through boundaries has always been the desired option. However, the state 
has always been the obstacle. As Aida Hozic presumes, the global merchants thrive 
on the contradiction between economic liberalization and sovereignty. The global 
merchants cannot be blamed that in their pursuit of profit they use legal or illicit 
networks. Their interest is in the ‘absent states’ as a depot for the illegal component of 
the world economy. It is European Union with its hypocritical policy of exclusion to 
be blamed for allowing such ‘non-states’ within the territories of Europe. 
        The European Unification is a triumph over the national sovereignty. The spread 
of TNC, rapid improvement of transportation and technologies and free markets 
liquidated nationalism among the Western countries. The same scheme could work 60 
years later in the Balkan context. However, the EU policies of inclusion and exclusion 
in this region will most probably create new economic and political ghettoes between 
the states, who liquidate their sovereignty inside the union, and countries who will 
abdicate their sovereignty outside in the periphery transforming into failed states, 
subjected to the global merchants’ mercy.  
        If  EU just incorporates the ‘good Balkan East’ and continues isolating and not 
giving enough economic and especially political incentives to the ‘Wild West’ that 
could have long term negative consequences, both in the region and in Europe, 
creating enormous mental, economical, political, cultural ghettoes in the very heart of 
the peninsula, in the heart of Europe. Luckily, more and more European policy 
makers are starting to realize that the Wild Balkan West should not be treated as a 
disgraceful disease, but as a healthy part of our common European body. Such shift in 
policy is evidenced by most recent analysis in The Economist: ‘EU ministers are 
suffering from enlargement fatigue and the possible failure of the Union’s new 
constitution. They do not want to deal with the former Yugoslavia. But policymakers 
who deal with the region believe that eventually the politicians will realize that it is 
                                                          
38
 Ronen Palan, Tax Heavens and commercialization of state sovereignity, International organization 
56:1,p. 151-176,2002 
39
 James H Mittelman, Robert  Johnston. The Globalization of Organized Crime: the Courtesan State 
and the Corruption of Civil Society, Global Governance 5:1,p.103-127,1999 
39
 Ibid. Hozic 
 
 25 
better to absorb and rehabilitate these countries than to leave them behind as destitute 
troublemakers.’41 And with a good reason, as the Wild Balkan West is here to stay… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 Geopolitical Implications for the Balkans of Bulgaria and 
Romania’s Accession to the EU 
 
3 .1 Collapse of the Old Geopolitical Order and the Emergence of New ‘Geo-
systems’42 in Eurasia 
 
      The collapse of the Soviet geopolitical system at the end of the twentieth century 
initiated radical geopolitical transformation processes in vast regions of Europe and 
Asia. The bi-polar confrontation-world-of-yesterday had forever dissolved to give 
way to a completely new international regime.  
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         Neither the political, nor the spatial understanding of the world would ever be 
the same, as used to be in the last fifty years. The new emerging geopolitical order 
challenged the traditional scholarship, numerous analyses, national doctrines and 
strategies, developed for decades by academia, scientific institutes, think tanks, 
governmental and non-government agencies. Even the whole notion of ‘what is 
Europe’ has shifted dramatically, i.e. generations have studied Mont Blanc as the 
highest elevation in Europe but recent geography textbooks proclaim 5,642m- mount 
Elbrus in the Caucasus as the new primus of Europe.43 
         As a result of the 
dismemberment of the 
USSR, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia, (and the 
unification of Germany), 
twenty-three new 
sovereign states appeared 
on the political map of 
Europe and Asia. 
Reflecting on this, Ioannis 
Loukas wrote  
Fig. 2a and 2b Five Newly Emerged Geo-Systems in Eurasia 
 
that the idea for ‘broadening of the Euro-Atlantic space to the East’44 was followed by 
a process of intensive revision of the traditional ‘perception regarding the 
whereabouts of the eastern border of Europe’ was45. Loukas also defines the 
formation of three new spatial ‘geo-systems’ on the territory of the former Soviet 
Union: ‘The Geo-system of Eastern Europe: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, 
Ukraine, Moldavia [sic], Russia, the geo-system of the Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan’ and ‘the geo-system of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan.’46 
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        Similarly the former communist space, outside of the Soviet Union formed 
several spatial ‘geo-systems’ using Loukas’s terminology. Namely, these are the 
Central European (Visegrad) countries: Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic, 
and and the Balkan countries: Albania, Bulgaria, 
Bosnia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia.47 Within 
these five spatial ‘geo-systems’ some very 
distinct sub-divisions emerged, along political, 
economical and cultural lines. For example, some states within certain spatial geo-
systems initiated processes of integration into the Euro-Atlantic space, while others 
were denied or were not interested in such a perspective. Therefore quite divergent 
paths of development emerged not only among the five new geo-systems, but also 
within systems. 
 
3.2 The Balkan Region in the New Geopolitical Order 
 
        Two of these spatial ‘geo-systems’ have always been perceived as turbulent, 
prone to instability, ‘buffer zones’, and namely the Balkans and the Caucasus. In the 
communist era they were at the southernmost border zones of the Soviet geopolitical 
system, somehow neither belonging to Europe, nor to Asia.  
         The new strategic alignments that appeared in the post-cold-war period 
completely changed the strategic position and significance of the latter regions. There 
are already some indications that the Balkans will not be regarded anymore as South-
eastern Europe, but as the southern part of Central Europe48, while the Caucasus ‘geo-
system’ will be ‘the new’ South-eastern Europe.49 The ‘new’ Eastern Europe will 
comprise of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus stretching to the Ural Mountains in the 
North and the Caucasus to the South.50 Thus for the first time in modern history the 
geographical boundaries of Europe proper will overlap with the political. Ioannis 
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Loukas believes that this will be the predominant paradigm in the twenty-first 
century.  
         Such a development 
positions the Balkan region at 
the very heart of Central Europe, 
and its clear perspective for 
political incorporation in the 
Euro-Atlantic space might 
further strengthen such identity. 
The latter process provides the 
Balkans with a very favorable 
political and economical  
 
Fig.3 The New Geographical Mapping of New Europe  
 
 
framework for development in addition to the strategic geography. In such new geo-
political and geo-economic conditions, geographical fate of ‘standing at the 
crossroads’, has the chance of transforming from ‘the biggest curse’ for Balkan 
people to their ‘biggest blessing’. 
         Fouskas writes that in post-Cold War international arena, when countries like UK 
and US go to war, ‘no moral or ethical principals appear in the equation.’51 In 
addition, ‘Behind some key (…) actions backed by the rhetoric of human rights lay 
strategic and geopolitical imperatives.’ The two major resources- oil and gas are 
‘coveted and contested by many Eurasian national actors.’52 Broadly, if we are talking 
geopolitics in the post-Cold War era, we are talking oil and gas. Most recent research 
in geopolitics or political geography looks at the oil and gas reserves, their extraction 
and transportation. Therefore in this chapter, exploring the emerging great 
geopolitical value of the Balkan region, mainly oil and gas projects would be 
regarded. This would be complemented with research on transport projects, which 
often overlap with oil and gas projects to form multimodal transnational corridors. A 
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small section would also be dedicated to nuclear projects with geopolitical importance 
in pre-accession Bulgaria and Romania. The above-mentioned three newly formed 
geo-systems would play main role of the oil and gas ‘big’ game of tomorrow. 
Namely, the Caucasus and Central Asia as producers and the Balkans, as the major 
transport route for this assets from East to West and South to North. Fouskas writes: 
The new independent states in Central Asia, The Caucasus and the Black Sea region, 
most of which were connected to the USSR’s energy network, have assumed a new 
geo-political centrality in Eurasia, which for the US is difficult to ignore.53 Moreover 
summarizing new American geo-politics, ‘the headache for the US has been how to 
avoid a repetition of the Middle East volatility in the Caspian and the Caucasus; how 
to guarantee the safe transportation of oil to Western markets ; as well as how to 
eliminate other regional (e.g. Russia, Iran) or global competitors (e.g. EU states).54 
The latter coupled with EU’s vital interests in a secure Balkan region for guaranteeing 
its security of energy supplies policy is  a good sign that largest international players 
have long-term interest for a stable and secure region, a major oil, gas and electricity 
hub of paramount geopolitical and geo-economic importance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Oil 
 
        The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed for the emergence of the above-
mentioned five new geo-systems on the territory of the previously consolidated 
former communist geopolitical block. (Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia, 
Visegrad, Balkans) Each of these new systems became involved in quite distinct inter 
and intra geo-political and geo-economic dynamics. 
       Such geopolitical rearrangement had quite pronounced geo-economic 
implications. Namely ‘1991 (…) saw [not only] the final collapse of the Soviet 
Union’, but the ‘opening up the oil and gas reserves of the New Independent States’, 
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which were previously controlled by Moscow.55 Two of the above-mentioned five 
new geo-systems, namely Central Asia and the Caucasus are especially rich in oil and 
gas reserves and ‘are [also] two of the few resource-rich regions that have not been 
[so far] heavily exploited by the world economy.’56 They open new oil and gas supply 
opportunities and could significantly challenge the world markets’ dominance of the 
Middle East geo-system. Specifically European Union recognized that ‘the newly 
opened-up resources of the Caspian region presented (…) [it] with an opportunity 
ultimately to strengthen its longer-term energy security’ by diversifying and 
increasing its energy supplies, as well as diminishing the dependence on traditional 
suppliers.57  
           World’s oil-demand-dependency on the Persian Gulf reserves rates at 40 % 
and is expected to rise by 2010 up to 52 %, if no alternative sources are developed.58 
The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 pushed developed countries to search for alternative 
sources in order to become more energy independent. As mentioned above with the 
fall of the communist system in the new geopolitical international order, the regions 
of Caucasus and Central Asia were recognized as part of the ‘larger belt’ of countries 
belonging to the Euro-Atlantic space.          
        Such a development provided a solution to the Western’s dependency problem, 
by allowing for access to the region’s ‘hundreds of billions of barrels of untapped oil 
reserves and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas [that] lay underneath the rugged, 
barren, inhospitable landscape of Central Asia around the Caspian Sea coastline and 
the Caucasus region.’ which could be an alternative to the Middle East supplies.  
EU energy security policy recognizes more and more that Caucasian and Central 
Asian natural deposits ‘represent a reserve which may become even more strategically 
significant in the twenty-first century’.59  
             However, ‘the transportation...from the distant (...) countries of the Caspian to 
Western Europe and Western hemisphere (USA) is the biggest challenge for the 
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Western oil companies operating in the region.’60The ‘oil and gas reserves of the 
Caspian Basin are landlocked and have to be transported across borders’. Due to the 
fact that most of this assets are in areas or countries, adjacent or even part of plethora 
of ethnic, political, economic, etc conflicts,  finding ‘a safe transportation passage’ to 
Western markets becomes a geopolitical asset, equal to the oil and gas  per se. 
 
Without oil and gas transport routes to market, (…) investments become worthless. Indeed, the 
control of pipeline routes - with the associated transit fees and the power to turn off the taps - is 
almost as important as the control over the resources themselves, which is why the struggle to 
find secure, reliable routes has become the Caspian region's main story. The fact that the routes 
need to pass through several different countries makes this 'game' especially difficult, as it only 
takes a problem in one of the countries to endanger the energy flow.61 
 
          This explains the pronounced interest of European energy security policy to 
somehow secure the safe transit routes in the geopolitical and security vacuum that 
emerged after the collapse of the previously tightly controlled geopolitical space. 
Namely, Brussels  introduced ‘the Lubbers Plan and a plethora of EU aid programs to 
eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (…) motivated by the bottom line of 
European energy security.’ The Lubbers Plan evolved into the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT), ‘a multilateral agreement - from an early stage including countries beyond 
Europe and the former Soviet Union - designed to provide a legal framework within 
which these basic aims could be pursued, with various EU programs springing up to 
aid their implementation.’ 
         Standing on major crossroads, the Balkan geo-system acquires a new role of 
paramount geopolitical and geo-economic significance per se and specifically for the 
EU’s energy security policy. No matter the region does not have strategic reserves of 
its own, its emerging geo-strategic and geo-economic power ‘resides in its 
geographical location, halfway between two major oil and gas supply regions - Russia 
and the Caspian - and large markets, such as Turkey, Southeast and Central Europe, 
and the Mediterranean.’ 62 The region is not only blessed for its geography, but also 
relatively stable, compared to the Caucasus, Eastern Turkey and Iran, which are the 
competing routes for bringing the Caucasian and Central Asian gas to Western 
markets. Indeed, in comparison with the former alternatives, the Western Black Sea 
                                                          
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Ibid. 
 32 
region, or in other words, the Eastern part of the Balkans (Bulgaria and Romania), 
offers the safest transit routes.  
      The need for construction of new pipelines is further enhanced by the record 
growth and mid-term expansionary projection of oil and gas extraction in Russia, 
Caucasus and Central Asia coupled with the ever-increasing physical, geographical, 
ecological and political inefficiencies of the traditional route, the Bosporus Straits. 
‘A crucial piece of this geopolitical jigsaw is the limited capacity of Turkey's Bosporus Straits 
to handle the increasing oil tanker traffic from the eastern Black Sea ports out towards the 
Mediterranean and world markets.   This has dictated the need for overland pipelines which 
bypass this shipping lane: southerly across Turkey (the Baku-Ceyhan plan) or westerly from the 
Black Sea ports of Bulgaria and Romania.’ 26 
 
The crowded and narrow Bosporus and Dardanelles straits in Turkey and the latter’s 
policy for restricting oil tankers-traffic brought up the issue for transportation of 
Caucasian and Central Asian oil through pipelines reaching the West Coast of the 
Black Sea and subsequently to the Western markets.63 
         The problems with the Bosporus require further scrutinizing. After the March, 
2001 completion of the Tengiz-Novorossiisk (CPC) pipeline that linked the 
Kazakhstan fields with the Russian Black Sea port, Russia managed to divert some of 
the oil deliveries through its territory, thus securing its own transit share in ‘the big oil 
game’. By 2015, estimates indicate that Russia’s oil export through Black Sea ports 
are expected to be not less than 50 million tons annually. By the same year, 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are expected to supply to the western markets 100-120 
million tons annually.64 Also according to estimates ‘even under the most optimal 
arrangements, Bosporus is incapable of letting through more than 70-80 million tons 
of oil a year.’65 Therefore, by the end of the next decade more than 100 million tons 
of export oil-shipments could be in danger of being disrupted.  
        Furthermore ‘while free passage of tankers through the Turkish Straits is 
guaranteed under the 1936 Montreux Treaty,(...)Turkey has been allowed to introduce 
stricter rules on the passage of large oil tankers and other vessels carrying ‘dangerous’ 
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cargoes, among other things, preventing such vessels from passing through the straits 
during the hours of darkness. 
         This is what led to the immense need of pipeline projects bypassing the 
Bosporus straits. At least four projects were considered as a solution to the problem, 
and namely Odessa-Brody-Gdansk, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Burgas-Alexandroupolis, 
Burgas-Vlore and the fifth Constanta –Trieste was rejected as it was considered 
economically insufficient.66 This was followed by intense competition among Balkan 
countries for priority of their ‘own’ project. The projects Burgas-Alexandroupolis, 
Burgas-Vlore and Constanta –Trieste pass through the Balkans and they are 
scrutinized in the sections below. 
 
  3.2.1.1 Russia and the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Project 
 
         In 1995 Russia initiated the creation of Transbalkan Oil Pipeline company to 
‘prepare feasibility 
studies and 
eventually to lay a 
pipeline from 
Bulgaria's Black 
Sea port [of] 
Burgas to the 
Greek port of 
Fig.4  Alternative Bosporus-Bypass Pipeline Projects on the Balkans 
 
Alexandroupolis on the Aegean.’67(marked with orange on fig.6) Such a project 
combining oil tanker transport from the Russian port of Novorosiisk to Burgas and 
then with pipeline to Alexandroupolis would allow for Kazakh and Russian oil to 
bypass the overcrowded Bosporus straits and provide an alternative route to the 
Western markets. Bulgaria and Greece would largely benefit from the project, as the 
transit taxes would be significant. The Transbalkan Oil Pipeline Company was 
scheduled to start its work at the end of 1995 and complete the project by 1998 the 
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latest. However most definitely such precision in planning and timing did fail to 
consider the Balkan inconsistencies, as Bulgaria and Greece, shortly after signing, 
started arguing over the percentage share in the company. While Russia has secured 
50% for itself, the two Balkan countries could not agree for the remaining percents. 
Greece insisted that Bulgaria should not have more than 5% of the shares, as it cannot 
provide sufficient funding.68 This has lead to seven-year gridlock of the project with 
significant economic losses, mainly from unrealized transit taxes, calculated for both 
Greece and Bulgaria.  An agreement between the two sides was reached as late as 
November 2002, when finally Bulgaria, Russia and Greece reached a political 
decision regarding the equal participation of the countries in the construction of the 
Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline. 
         The Burgas –Alexandroupolis Project pipeline (orange color on fig.6) would 
consist of a 280 km-long pipeline with a capacity of 15,000,000 tones/year, planned 
to reach an optimum of 35,000,000 tones/year. The pipeline is estimated to cost 
approximately 660 million dollars and further 300 million for adjacent infrastructure 
at the ports of Burgas and Alexandroupolis. According to the agreement from 2002, 
each country had to invest equal share of 220 million dollars. The 2002 -Agreement 
between Bulgaria and Greece might lead to the conclusion that after a decade of 
discord, the Balkan countries might have finally learned to respect the laws of 
economics, where efficiency and competitive advantages dominate over egoistic 
geopolitical concerns and narrow-interest planning.  
 
3.2.1.2 USA and the AMBO Burgas-Vlorë Project 
 
          In 1996, the newly established Albanian-Macedonian-Bulgarian Oil 
Corporation (AMBO) initiated the Burgas-Vlorë project. The AMBO Burgas-Vlorë 
line (marked with red on fig. 6) is expected to be 898 km long and has a planned 
capacity of 35,000,000 tones per year.69 The estimated price of the project is 1.13 
billion US dollars. The American government within the framework of the South 
Balkan Development Initiative (SBDI) of the Trade and Development Agency (TDA) 
directly supported this project. It closely follows the route of transport Corridor VIII 
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from Black Sea to the Adriatic (passing consequently through Bulgaria, Albania and 
Macedonia). What is peculiar about this project is that ‘exclusive rights for the 
AMBO pipeline and corridor VIII were granted to the Anglo-American  
Fig.5 The AMBO oil pipeline project 
 
AMBO group.’70 The latter is declared the only party ‘allowed to build the planned 
pipeline from Burgas to Vlore’and also AMBO has the sole rights to negotiate with 
creditors and investors.71  
              Some analysts like Michel 
Chossudovsky write that this project, 
which is strongly backed by the US 
government ‘supports the interests of 
the oil giants, including BP-Amoco-
ARCO, Chevron and Texaco.’72 The 
project had reached a very advanced 
stage, but the conflict in Kosovo slowed down its implementation. However, AMBO 
has initiated fundraising campaign in US and elsewhere and ‘once financing is 
secured, the pipeline could be constructed in four years.’73         
         The AMBO-pipeline project was fiercely opposed by Romania and Greece and 
to a smaller extent by Turkey.74 The former two were ardently lobbying for the 
alternative projects, passing through their own territories. Furthermore, some analysts 
believe that Greece had finally agreed to the equal share for the Bulgarian side under 
‘the treat’ of the rapidly advancing Burgas-Vlorë project. Furthermore, Greece was 
hoping that if the prognosis for ‘slowing oil demand growth on the world markets’ 
turned out to be correct and the Greek project was commissioned first, this would 
make the AMBO project economically insufficient. Greece policy makers also 
believed that if construction of the former project predated the latter, the Bulgarian 
side would discontinue its political support for the ‘rival’ Bulgarian-Macedonian-
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Albanian AMBO project, which is a required pre-requisite for its commissioning.75 
However while seven years the AMBO and Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline projects 
were in constant rivalry (with Greece supporting the latter and Bulgaria constantly 
changing its support), Romanian political elites surprised everybody with their 
alternative project Constanta-Trieste. 
 
3.2.1.3 EU and the Constanta-Trieste Project 
 
         Despite that the Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei Plesu has declared in 1998 
‘that Romania's policy on Caspian oil transit is based on regional cooperation’ and 
‘closer cooperation rather than competition will make the transit bids of Ukraine, 
Romania and Bulgaria stronger’76, he initiated a new fierce competition on the 
Balkans. Taking advantage of the gridlock in the Bulgarian-Greek negotiations over 
the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline, Romania revived (the previously rejected as 
inefficient) project for a route, passing through its territory from the port of Constanta 
on the Black Sea to the port of Trieste on the Adriatic (marked with blue on fig.6) In 
the year, when Bulgaria and Greece finally agreed upon the percentage shares in the 
consortium, Romania intensified its efforts to provide funding for its route, through 
different sources such as The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) ,77despite 
the fact that the route passes from an extremely long, difficult and volatile area 
through the Carpathian Mountains and the Western Balkans and cuts off the 
Mediterranean Sea.’78 Thus, the latter characteristics made the Romanian project 
much less economically viable than Burgas-Alexandroupolis project and the AMBO 
projects with its 1300km length, compared to 280 and 900km respectively. Despite 
the fact that 63% of the infrastructure of Constanta-Trieste exists, its completion 
would cost 1 billion US dollars, just as much as AMBO and twice as much as Burgas-
Alexandroupolis project. From the technical data is clear that the Romanian proposal 
was not motivated by ‘most shortest and profitable routes, situated according to where 
the natural geographical morphology of the Balkans is most facilitating to such 
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projects.’79 Rather it was triggered by the Romanian geopolitical desire to attract the 
routes of the Caspian gas solely through its territory despite the fact that its project is 
not economically efficient. Greece perfectly aware of the limited local and external 
funds for the Bosporus- bypass projects tried to discredit the Romanian project in 
front of EU donors, funding institutions, public opinion. In this respect the statement 
of Greek Minister of Economy and Finance Nicos Christodoulakis, regarding the 
Constanta-Trieste project is characteristic ‘For such issues, the map itself usually 
gives the best answer.’80 
         In the era of the Dawn of New Middle East (Caucasus oil fields), the interests 
surrounding Balkan transit pipelines are an immense interplay of global oil giants’ 
interests, EU, US and Russian attention. However, it cannot be ruled out that the 
Balkan countries have enough leverage to influence the different projects’ 
implementation. Furthermore even if the fact that the Burgas-Alexandroupolis project 
is backed by Russia, the AMBO by the US-administration, and the Constanta-Trieste 
by the EU81 is taken into account, it cannot be denied that for a decade Balkan 
political elites used their limited influence to ardently obstruct rivalry projects and 
lobby for ‘their own’ project, despite feasibility studies, economic efficiency 
prognosis and technical parameters data. 
3.2.2 Gas: Nabucco Project 
Another trans-national project of major geo-political significance that underlies 
the increasing geo-political weight of the Balkan region, is a planned gas pipeline 
project to deliver Middle Eastern and  Caucasian gas through Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Hungary to Baumgarten in Austria, ensuring diverse supply sources and 
routes for consumers who currently rely totally on Russian exports.’ The gas pipeline 
from the Middle East and the Caspian region to Central and Western Europe via the 
Balkans, better known as the Nabucco Project ‘was entered as a priority into the 
Trans European Networks – Energy Program.’82 Furthermore the European 
Commission ‘has approved the proposed feasibility study financing and agreed to 
offer the maximum grant, which amounts to 50% of the cost’ (2mln EUR), which 
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shows the utmost importance of that project to the EU’s Energy security policy. 
Nabucco, which was ‘named for a Verdi opera after a consortium outing in Vienna’ is 
projected to be between 3400 and 4000 km long; the expected annual consumption is 
25 (to 30)  bln cubic meters: 6 to 8 bln cu m in the countries of transit and 14 to 17 
bln cu m in the countries in Central and Western Europe.83 The estimated costs for 
commissioning the project  are expected to be between 4.5 to 5 bln EUR. 
       The Nabucco consortium is a joint initiative of the gas companies of Turkey 
(Botas), Bulgaria (Bulgargas), Romania (Transgaz). Hungary (MOL) and Austria 
(OMV). These companies ‘have been negotiating the project intensively and 
successfully since November 2002.’84 The project has now entered into its financing 
matters specifications and designing stage, after a feasibility study was completed in 
2004. The same year ‘project partners have founded Nabucco Company Pipeline 
Study GmBH in order to engage in project finance and pipeline capacity marketing 
studies.’ After the current stage is completed by 2007, the actual construction work is 
planned for 2008 to 2012.85 
         The project would target Iran, as the main source of the gas supply, as the latter 
has the world's second largest reserves after Russia, but ‘gas from Azerbaijan or from 
Russia's Blue Stream pipeline to Turkey or even Egypt or Libya [are considered] 
potential suppliers.’86 At the other end, ‘the target (…) is to put in 30 bcm at the 
Turkish border and receive 15-17 bcm at the Austrian border.’87 Therefore, large part 
of the transported gas would be utilized by the transit countries. Therefore the geo-
political significance of the Nabuccco project for the region is coupled with a geo-
economic importance as such guaranteed regular gas deliveries are ‘aimed to supply 
[the] fast-growing Balkan and Eastern European states. 
        The Nabucco project is of utmost importance for many key geo-political 
‘players’. For EU, ‘the goal is to create new infrastructure to supply future European 
gas demand from a new region and via a new transport route, independent of old ones 
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through Russia and Ukraine.’88 Currently two thirds of Europe’s gas is supplied by 
Russia. This explains why EU’s security policies rely on diversification of gas 
supplies, through major gas transport projects from new regions, such as the Nabucco 
project. However, security by diversification is not the only consideration for the EU 
.The estimated European gas demand by 2030 would be 300 bcm higher than current 
levels of about 500 bcm.89 At the same time ‘the signs are [the Russia’s main 
supplier] Gazprom [will not be] able to cover Europe's entire gas demand in the next 
20 years’. Therefore, projects as Nabucco, are not just ‘precautionary’ or 
‘complementary’, but are a matter of vital economic and political interests for the 
EU’s energy security policy. 
       
     In conclusion, ‘the Balkan zone constitutes a significant transport route for oil and 
gas, and it is thus a strategic bridge. In this context, the Balkans can be viewed as the 
geo-political gatekeeper between Western and Eastern Eurasia, acquiring a security 
dimension of paramount importance for NATO and the US.’90      
3.2.3 Nuclear 
In this section ‘power wars’ between Bulgaria and Romania in the past will be 
explored and the most recent positive developments in their energy relations. The two 
countries are still connected with the United Power Systems (UPS) electric grid of 
former COMECON countries through Moldova, Ukraine and Russia and would 
connect to the main European grid, also known as Union for the Coordination of 
Production and Transmission of Electricity (UCPTE).  Thus it would become possible 
‘to transfer large quantities of electricity between Russia and the Ukraine on the one 
side, and UCPTE on the other, without endangering the performance standards of the 
latter’, making Balkan countries ‘the cheapest and readiest bridge between the power 
systems of Europe and Russia’91, calculating huge transit tax-profits and enhancing 
their home gas infrastructure and consumption.  
             In 1970 after a bilateral agreement between the USSR and Bulgaria, 
commenced the construction of the first nuclear plant on the Balkans-NPP Kozloduy. 
More than 100 000[!] workers are involved in the massive project. The first two 440 
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MW units are put in commercial operation respectively in July 1974 and November 
1975. Units 3 and 4 are put in commercial operation correspondingly in December 
1980 and may 1982 and the last two Units 5 and 6 with reactors WWER-1000/V-320 
are completed in September 1988 and December 1993.92 Upon its completion, the 
nuclear plant at Kozloduy is being proclaimed the biggest pride of the Bulgarian 
industry.      
         In 1979, Romanian autocrat Nicolae Ceaucescu perceived the newly constructed 
Bulgarian plant as an impetus for his own ‘grandiose dreams of building five or more 
reactors’ at the Cernavoda site on the river Danube. 93 ‘Canada’s export credit agency, 
the Export Development Corporation (EDC), provided a one billion US dollars- loan 
to Romania for construction of the Cernavoda nuclear station.’94 Canada’s state 
nuclear company, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), cooperated with the 
forced construction of the plant but ‘these plans collapsed through technical 
incompetence and lack of funds.’95 Following the disintegration of the totalitarian 
system, further loans from the EDC and other Italian donors were taken for the 
completion of the plant. Twenty years after the initial negotiations started the result 
was the incredible 2.2 billion dollars cost of the project with only one unit put into 
exploitation, as late as April 1996.  
          The latter date could be traced as the starting point of the Bulgarian-Romanian 
‘nuclear wars’. The opening of the single nuclear unit at Cernavoda (1996) coincided 
with pressures, exerted by EU on Bulgarian authorities to close the first four of the 
units at Kozloduy. Bulgarian political elites and the media suspected that there is a 
‘conspiracy against Bulgaria’ and ‘France and Canadian companies that have put 
money into Romania's sole nuclear plant at Cernavoda would like Romania to replace 
Bulgaria as a Balkan energy supplier,96 Furthermore ‘international pressures are 
exerted to close the Kozlodui nuclear power plant... coming mainly from Canada and 
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Italy with the intention to recover ‘the billions invested in the plant in Cernavoda.’’97 
The tension intensified to such an extent that when the Romanian president visited 
Bulgaria to attend the Greece-Bulgaria-Romania Trilateral Summit, the most 
significant daily Trud (Labor) ‘expressed its regrets for the fact that the Romanian 
President had not been welcomed with rotten tomatoes and eggs.’98 
         While it is clearly exaggerated that there is some kind of conspiracy against 
Bulgaria, it is also a clear fact that Balkan countries are one of the main initiators of 
the negative EU-opinion. Greece, as the only EU-member in the region uses its 
influence to persuade the European Commission to exert pressure on Bulgaria for the 
early closure of the Kozloduy plant. According to Greek Environment, Town 
Planning and Public Works Minister- Costas Laliotis: 
 
 The reactor's operation was a ‘huge mistake’ and said the European Union has adopted a 
proposal by the Greek ministry calling for Bulgaria to cease the reactor's operation, with 
domestic electricity demand covered by neighboring nations' grids. Mr. Laliotis said the EU has 
agreed to cover power transfer costs.99(emphasis mine) 
 
         In 1999, the conflict intensified after an ultimatum from the European 
Commission to Bulgaria announcing that Bulgaria should ‘specify a schedule for the 
early closure of the four reactors at its Kozluduy nuclear power plant as a pre-
condition for [initiation of] European Union accession talks.’100 
         At present, the nuclear plant at Kozloduy contributes from 44 to 46% of the total 
annual energy production in Bulgaria. Bulgarian energy system covers 45% of the 
constant deficit in the common energy balance of the Balkan countries, which is 
‘accessed as a significant contribution to the economic stabilization of the region’101 
and that makes the country the leading exporter of energy in South Eastern Europe.102  
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         However if the first four units of the Kozloduy plant are closed until 2006, as 
the European Commission insists, Bulgaria will turn from a major energy exporter to 
chief importer in the region. As the political elites perceive that such a step would 
have strongly negative consequences for the Bulgarian economy, ‘Romania is... over 
eager to exploit the economic opportunities, which it believes, will ensue.’103 
Furthermore, Bulgaria not very modestly perceives itself as the ‘regional pivot of the 
Balkans’, that it is ‘a pole of stability’ and that ‘many people rely on Sofia for the 
solution of their own problems.’104 Largely this perception is empowered by the 
country’s leading position in the Balkan energy export market. Romania is also facing 
over capacity in electricity generation and decreasing home consumption105 That is 
why ‘Romania has pinned its hopes on the Kozloduy shutdown to help it become the 
leading regional electricity exporter.’106 
         As part of its energy, policy Bulgaria intentionally levied very high transit taxes 
for Romanian energy transport to Greece and Turkey, which made Romanian energy 
export economically uncompetitive. Romanian Minister Basescu accused that ‘Sofia... 
[was] blocking for years Romania's plans to export electricity elsewhere in the 
Balkans.’ 107 Although there is a constant deficit of electricity in the Balkan market, 
Bulgaria obstructs the possibility for other energy exporters to cover this deficit by 
imposing high transit taxes.  
          On its part, Romanian political elites push for the closure of the Bulgarian 
plant, despite the fact that the first two units produce the cheapest energy in Europe 
with 1kW/h estimated fewer than 2 cents108. The exporter who would replace the 45% 
Bulgarian share in the Balkan deficit coverage would most certainly introduce much 
higher prices, which would calculate great economic losses to Greece, Turkey, 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Macedonia and Bulgaria, which all would have 
to pay the new prices for their energy imports. The only ‘winner’ would be Romania. 
However, as a whole the region would become much more externally-energy-
dependent as the single unit at Cernavoda would not be able to substitute for the four 
                                                          
103
 Marian Chiriac, ‘‘Power Wars’ Between Bulgaria and Romania’, Balkan Crisis Report, 89 (1999) 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 Marian Chiriac, ‘Power Wars’. 
106
 Ibid. 
107
 Ibid. 
108Marin Devedzhiev and Todor Kondakov, ‘The Premature Unit-Decommissioning of NPP Kozloduy 
Would Cost Us One Billion Dollars’, Memorandum, Bulgarian Geopolitical Community in 
Macedonia, 2 (2002), 8. 
 43 
closed units at Kozloduy. Thus, the Romanian, Yugoslavian and Greek political elites, 
which persistently declare the Kozloduy nuclear plant as the ‘biggest treat to the 
region’, would most certainly calculate significant economic losses from the eventual 
closure.  
         This energy rivalry seems even more irrational after on 15 November 2002 ten 
Southeast European Governments signed upon the agreement of establishing a 
common electricity market by the year 2005, as a step of its integration to the 
common electricity market of the EU.109Such peculiarity is not left unnoticed even by 
local scientific circles: 
Although both Romania and Bulgaria ostensibly agreed on September 10 to link all 
national energy grids and thus create a regional electricity market in the Balkans, the 'power 
war', as the media have called the latest conflict between the two countries, rumbles on and 
reflects a long history of economic competition.110 
 
          Furthermore narrow political interests and the consequent obstruction prevents 
both countries to become together the major transit point between two large electric 
grids. Balkan countries’ grid is still connected with the United Power Systems (UPS) 
electric grid of former COMECON countries through Moldova, Ukraine and 
Russia.111 With their accession to the EU Bulgaria and Romania would inevitably be 
connected to the main European grid and namely, Union for the Coordination of 
Production and Transmission of Electricity (UCPTE). Thus, as Georgy Ganev wrote it 
would become possible ‘to transfer large quantities of electricity between Russia and 
the Ukraine on the one side and UCPTE on the other, without endangering the 
performance standards of the latter’.112 This would make Balkan countries ‘the 
cheapest and readiest bridge between the power systems of Europe and Russia’113, 
calculating huge transit tax-profits and enhancing their home gas infrastructure and 
consumption.  
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3.2.4 Transport 
.. .Dim politicians might do exist in this world, but definitely not dim drivers-Ognyan Minchev 
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Fig.6 Pan-European Transport Corridors 
 
 
 
               The expressed commitment for accepting the Balkan ‘geo-system’ as part of 
the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical system required the economic and military stabilization 
of the region. As an implication of such pursuit for economical reconstruction and 
secure environment of the region, lead to the creation of the Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe (SPSEE) on 10 June 1999 in Cologne.  The Stability Pact was also 
‘the first serious attempt by the international community to replace the previous, 
reactive crisis intervention policy in South Eastern Europe with a comprehensive, 
long-term conflict prevention strategy.’114 Thus, it aimed at promoting a ‘secure 
environment’115, sustainable democratic development and economic prosperity. 
SPSEE also had to foster close cooperation between the countries of the region on one 
hand and between them and the European Union on the other. The latter is a key actor 
in the Stability Pact. It also ‘undertakes to draw South Eastern Europe ‘closer to the 
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perspective of full integration ... into its structures’, including eventual full 
membership.’116 
         In the framework of this new political and economic cooperation, the role of 
Transport was recognized as of utmost importance for the fulfillment of the common 
goals of the European Union and the transition countries from the new geo-systems. 
The prospect of the accession of the east European countries in the EU gave birth to 
the vision of the integration of Western Europe’s. The Trans European Networks 
(TEN) were officially agreed upon in 1996, to serve as the basic multimodal road, rail, 
energy and communication corridors in the EU’s infrastructure. At the pan-European 
Conference of Transport Ministers in Crete (1994) and in Helsinki (1997), fifty two 
countries decided to plan the building of ten more multimodal corridors, located in the 
accession countries, in order to connect the EU’s Trans European Networks (TEN) 
with the infrastructure of Eastern Europe117, as one of the main initiatives aiming at 
supporting the latter’s economy stabilization and facilitating the establishment of the 
future common European market. The program, connected with the implementation of 
the pan-European transport corridors was called the Transport Infrastructure Needs 
Assignment (TINA) initiative. Representative of EU- countries as well as of the 10 
acceding countries (plus Cyprus) participated in the initiative. 
         At its final stage the TINA Network should comprise of ‘18,683 km of roads, 
20,924 km of railway lines, 4,052 km of inland waterways, 40 airports, 20 seaports, 58 
river ports and 86 terminals (out of which, 20 are situated in seaports and river ports, 
and 66 stand alone)’118 and should be fully integrated into the already existing Trans 
European Networks (TEN). The EU has set 2015 as an objective for reaching that goal. 
The estimated budget for the whole project by the year 2015 is 90 billion Euros, as for 
the Balkan part of the project, nearly 11 billion Euros.119 
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Fig.7  Pan-European Transport Corridors on the Balkans 
 Map courtesy of  balcanica.org 
 
Considering the very favorable geographic location, the Balkan lands are perceived as 
the key to three continents- Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. They are also 
located on the boundary of three civilization zones according to Samuel Huntington’s 
civilization paradigm. This important geopolitical location has so far always influenced 
negatively the Balkan countries' history and determined the great geopolitical stake 
concentrated on this relatively small territory. However, after the collapse of the 
communist system, the geographical fate of being at a crossroad is no more a burden, 
but a very important geo-political and geo-economic asset. To put it simply –nowadays 
crossroad means money. Crossroad means security. Therefore, considering the 
geographic position of the Balkans, it comes as no surprise that six of the ten 
multimodal: transport, oil, gas and telecommunication corridors, planned at the 
Helsinki summit in 1997, pass through the Balkans and namely Corridors IV, V, VII, 
VIII, IX, X , which will be explored in detail below. (see fig. and Appendix 1). 
 
 3.2.4.1 Transport Corridor N    IV and Corridor X 
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Both of the pan European Transport Corridors IV and X  go along one of the most 
commercially relevant and ancient routes of transportation of people, goods and 
communications. Namely Western Europe-Central Europe-Balkans-Turkey-Middle 
East and Asia.  
The Corridor IV (marked 
with orange on fig.5) links 
Dresden (Germany) to 
Istanbul (Turkey) via 
Prague, Bratislava, Gjor, 
Budapest, Arad, Crajova, 
Sofia and Plovdiv. Ways 
diverge to provide links to 
Nuremberg, Vienna,  
Fig.8 Transport Corridor IV and Corridor X 
 
Bucharest and Constanta (Corridor IVa). Corridor X (marked with brown on fig 5) 
crosses Salzburg (Austria), Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, Nis, Skopje, Veles and 
Thessalonica (Greece).120 
         While EU Commission as a project of utmost importance regarded corridor IV 
during the Yugoslav conflicts as a conflict-bypass route, its relevance significantly 
diminished at the end of the crisis. After the fall of the Milosevic regime transport 
routes through Serbia (along Corridor X were restored). However, Bulgaria and 
Romania’s accession to the EU will create for the first time geographical integrity of 
the union, linking Hungary to the north and Greece to the south. The removed barriers 
within such an enlarged union would significantly divert traffic through corridor N IV 
again, as all the countries on the route will be within EU territory. As Corridor X and 
Corridor IV are perceived by local political elites as rivaling, rather than 
complementary it is understandable that different countries lobbied for preferential 
commissioning of one or either projects. For Bulgaria and Romania, the speedy 
completion of the missing infrastructure of Corridor IV and the accession to the EU in 
2007 would create the possibility for a major geopolitical regrouping. Very significant 
part of the commercial flows of traditional corridor X might be diverted largely 
through Bulgarian and Romanian territory along Corridor IV. This is a significant 
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geopolitical development as the Vienna-Belgrade-Sofia-Istanbul road connection has 
been the ‘undisputed monopolist’ for centuries. However, a vital missing link 
prevents this project of becoming fully functional and namely- the missing Danube 
Bridge in the west part of the river between Bulgaria and Romania. As one single 
bridge might have immense geopolitical and geo-economic implications, the case is 
largely explored below. 
         A peculiar fact is that in the 470 km-long common Bulgarian-Romanian border 
along the river Danube, there is only one bridge in operation, connecting the two 
countries, and namely the Ruse-Giurgiu Bridge in the east part of the border (68 km 
away from Bucharest). (see fig.4)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.9 Bulgarian and Romanian Geopolitical Clashes over the Second Danube Bridge 
Project 
 
         For comparison only in Budapest alone with Lágymányos Bridge completed 
recently, there are nine permanent bridges spanning between the two shores of the 
river121. Furthermore, ‘along the total [European], Danube navigable length, 104 
bridges are built at an average distance of 21.38 kilometers. The distance between the 
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last bridge, Moldova - Veke Bridge, and the Danube Bridge at Ruse is 556.42 km’122, 
which is 40 times longer than the average density in the upper part of the river.  
          The bridge at Ruse, or ‘The Bridge of Friendship’, as it was called, was opened 
back in 1954 and served mainly the trade relations of the Balkan countries and the 
USSR. The bridge was a significant element of the infrastructure, comprising of road, 
rail, gas and oil connections, serving the Northeastern direction (from Balkans to 
USSR) of trade flows, cultural and military interaction. 
          The new geopolitical order strongly diminished the importance of the Balkan 
countries’ trade connections with Russia, as most of them reoriented their import-
export policies towards the EU-markets. Thus the corridor through Ruse gave way to 
the route along the ancient Via Militaris from Istanbul through Sofia to Belgrade and 
Western Europe (marked with blue on fig.4) in terms of geopolitical significance, 
because it is the shortest land connection between the Near East, Middle East and 
Europe. The new international regimes and geopolitical order positioned the 
European Union as the new major trade partner for the Balkan economies, thus the 
Via Militaris was perceived as the backbone along which the ‘return to Europe’ 
project would concentrate.  
         However, the war conflict in former Yugoslavia, which started on June 27, 1991 
when the Yugoslav People's Army marched into Slovenia, and the subsequent wars 
with Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo in the next decade, had a strong impact on the 
transport system in the Balkans. The wars ‘virtually made unusable the shortest route 
from Western Europe to the Balkans and Asia’ and namely the Via Militaris.  Such a 
state of affairs provoked a nervous search for an ‘alternative route to the EU that 
circumvents Serbian territory’123, as the losses that the Balkan economies suffered 
from the embargo on Yugoslavia and the blocked routes amounted billions of dollars. 
Around 1996, only for Bulgaria the figure was estimated at 4 bln dollar- losses.124  
          The initial idea for construction of a second Danube bridge dates back to 1993. 
However negotiations started, as late as in 1995, when Bulgaria and Romania decided 
to build an alternative route to Western Europe: a ‘strategic bridge that could link the 
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countries of Southeast Europe afflicted by the crisis with the European transport 
system.’125 EU announced that it would support the project with a 200 million ECU 
credit on very favorable terms.126 That was perceived as the ‘the only real 
compensation for the damages the two countries suffered from the embargo against 
Yugoslavia’.127 However the location of the new bridge turned out to be a highly –
contested issue, with Romania staunchly refusing to consider any variant to the west 
of the port of Nikopol. (red line on fig.4-Bulgarian projects of interest to the west of 
the line, Romanian-to the east), while Bulgaria supporting a connection at the very 
west part of the border at Vidin-Calafat or Lom-Rast. In particular, the Romanian side 
proposed three variants on the Bucharest meeting between Bulgarian prime minister 
Jan Videnov and Romanian president Ion Iliescu, held in 1996 and namely: a link at 
Nikopol - Turnu Magurele, new bridge at Ruse, or Silistra to the east. (see fig.4) Such 
variants were economically inefficient as they would increase significantly the total 
length of the road and also they would overlap with the already-built bridge at Ruse, 
serving mainly the connection to Northern Europe and the CIS countries, but 
completely inadequate as a connection serving the ties with Western Europe. For 
example the Budapest - Szeged - Arad - Pitesti - Bucharest - Ruse  - Sofia - 
Thessaloniki is 1553 km long, while the road through Vidin –Calafat would be just 
1289 km, only 238 km longer than the classical route from Istanbul through Belgrade 
to Budapest.128 (1051km.) 
           In 1994 the British independent consultancy company Sir Alexander Gibb was 
financed by the PHARE program to research ‘the second bridge necessity and to find 
‘its most appropriate place, through estimating the traffic’129 The survey concluded 
that the most appropriate place for the bridge is at the western part of the river at 
Lom-Rast (which is very near to Vidin-Calafat), which is the shortest and potentially 
economically most profitable variant. However, official Bucharest denied these 
results and continued to obstruct the implementation of the project. From the facts 
stated above it is visible, that the Romanian side declared its willingness to participate 
in a construction of an alternative bridge, while at the same time obstructing it as 
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much as possible, when it comes to actual steps towards the realization of the project. 
Where does this irrationality arise? 
         First, if the bridge is constructed at the northwestern part of the border at Lom-
Rast or Vidin-Calafat (as all independent surveys recommend), this will position 
Bucharest away from the main transport routes to Western Europe. Romania is trying 
to promote the IVa branch of Corridor IV starting at Romania’s major port of 
Constanta. (explored below in detail) 
         Second, the more the bridge shifts to the west, the more it would decrease the 
transit length on Romanian territory. Acting as ‘irrational egoistic state’ Romania 
would prefer to preserve the status-quo, despite the pressures from the EU and most 
of the Balkans countries, which are all interested in the existence of the alternative 
route. The Romanian political elites prefer to develop infrastructure along the corridor 
Budapest - Bucharest - Constanta – Istanbul (see fig. 4), which will put Constanta 
Port in a key position;130 Another direction favored by Bucharest is the route 
‘Budapest - Bucharest - Ruse - Sofia – Thessaloniki (see fig.4), which will maintain 
the long transit and Bucharest’s role as a key transport junction’.131      
         Third, as Yordanka Gancheva from the Institute of Market Economics wrote, for 
Romania ‘65 % of 1998 annual export is directed to EU. The trade volume with 
Bulgaria, Greece and Macedonia all together is negligible, and for this reason 
transport costs are not of paramount importance’. Thus, the Romanian side does not 
have the impetus to develop the shortest southern connections, as they would only 
underestimate Bucharest and port of Constanta. Furthermore, Romania has the 
interest to obstruct the second bridge on the Danube, as it ‘will have bigger benefits 
from long-distance transits, rather than from establishing shortest trade routes.’132 
         On the Third All European Ministerial Conference on Transport –Helsinki, 
1997, where the map of the transport corridors was specified it was decided that 
Corridor IV should pass through Vidin-Calafat. However, the Romanian side pushed 
that the route of Corridor IV ‘should divert to Constanta as no. IV a’133 (see fig.1) 
Since then Romanian political elites further enhanced their obstruction of the second 
bridge, trying to invalidate the southern direction of Corridor IV to Thessaloniki and 
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Istanbul and develop it only in the part, that diverts to Constanta. As an implication of 
that policy, the first modern Romanian highway was recently opened between 
Bucharest and Constanta and in 1996 Romania has opened the new ferry ‘Eforie’ 
running between Constanta and port of Samsun in Turkey.134 
         What Bucharest most obviously did not take into account was that after the war 
conflicts in Yugoslavia were over the natural trade flows would return along the 
shortest Via Militaris route from Istanbul-Sofia-Belgrade-Wien, circumventing 
Romania and excluding it from the ‘big geopolitical game’. Moreover, after the 
normalization in Yugoslavia, the EU, the SPSEE and other international factors are 
much less inclined to financially support the bridge-project. As Gergana Dimitrova 
wrote, the project ‘might seem to be losing its outward significance after the end of 
the Kosovo crisis and the disappearance of the pariah Yugoslavia’. 135 
           The two countries have missed substantial opportunities to attract some of the 
flows of the Via Militaris route, to receive generous support to implement the project 
from outside donors, such as EIB, the PHARE program in the period 1995-2000, at 
the time when the project was of high priority for the international community as an 
alternative route to the one through troubled Yugoslavia.  If the project was 
accomplished in that period, the economies of the two countries would suffer much 
slighter losses than the billion-dollar ones indicated from the embargo upon 
Yugoslavia and the hundred of millions, lost during the Kosovo crisis.136 
        Most probably as a consequence of the latter developments there are some 
positive indications that the logic of economics could prevail over egoistic 
geopolitical considerations, as after ten years of gridlock a Bilateral Agreement for 
the construction of a new bridge at Vidin-Calafat was signed on 5th June, 2000 and 
ratified on 6th April, 2001 by the parliaments of the two countries. However, this was 
only achieved after Special Coordinator of the SPSEE Bodo Hombach declared that 
the project for the second Danube Bridge is taken out of the competence of the 
bilateral relations Bulgaria-Romania and is a project of European primary political 
and economical concern. As discussed above, he crucial importance of Corridor IV 
for the EU comes from the fact that after Bulgaria and Romania’s accession in 2007 
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that corridor would run entirely within EU territory and would actually constitute the 
shortest route between the EU and the newly enlarged territories to the South in the 
Balkans.  
 
 
 
       3.2.4.2 Transport Corridor N    VII 
 
By far the biggest and most important EU inland waterway is the ‘The Rhine-Main-
Danube-Waterway’. After its construction in 1992, a commercial route between the 
North and Black seas was open with tremendous economic capacities and importance. 
Specifically the canal builds the link between the mouth of the Rhine into the 
Northern Sea and the mouth of the Danube into the Black Sea. This waterway has an 
extension of 3,500 km and is divided into four sections: 
• The 539 km Rhine section from Rotterdam to the mouth of the river Main at 
Mainz  
• The 384 km stretch of the river Main from Mainz to Bamberg  
• The 171 km stretch of the canal between Bamberg and Kelheim  
• The 2,411 km section of the Danube from Kelheim to the mouth of the 
Danube into the Black Sea137 
Transport Corridor 
VII largely refers 
to the fourth and 
largest section of 
the Rhine-Main-
Danube-
Waterway. 
Precisely, as 
specified in  ‘the  
Fig.10 Transport Corridor VII 
                                                                                                                                                                      
136
 About Bulgaria, ‘Economy’. 
137The Rhine-Main-Danube-Waterway, available at http://www.schiffahrtsverein.de/waterw.htm, last 
accessed May, 2005. 
 55 
 
3rd Pan European Transport Conference of Helsinki, June 1997, the Pan-European 
Transport Corridor VII refers to the Danube inland waterway, the Black Sea-Danube 
Canal, the Danube branches Kilia and Sulina, the inland waterway links between the 
Black Sea and the Danube, the Danube – Sava canal, the Danube – Thissa canal, and 
the relevant port infrastructures situated on these inland waterways.’ 138 After the 
opening of the Rhine-Main-Danube-Waterway, transport Corridor VII is expected to 
divert a substantial part of European rail and road traffic and serve as a major 
economic artery running from Northwest to Southeast throughout the whole 
continent. However due to various reasons, such as frequent and irregular fluctuations 
in waterway depths or different infrastructural bottlenecks, the transport capacities of 
Corridor VII are still largely unutilised.139  It is estimated that ‘the Danube has 
enough free capacities to increase the volume of transport by the year 2015 from 
currently 12 million tons to about 30 million tons on the condition that appropriate 
development measures are taken. Danube navigation has much higher transport 
capacities in comparison to other transport modes. For example a pushed convoy 
carrying 3700 tons of freight corresponds to 93 train cars with 40 tons each or 148 
trucks with 25 tons each.’140 Transport corridor VII’s very favourable transportation 
costs could have enormous economic implication for European economy, and 
especially for the countries along the river. For example, only Austrian Economy can 
save up to EUR 30 million annually on transportation costs. In addition, this is also a 
sustainable and more efficient transport system.  
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Fig.11 The Rhein-Main-Danube-Waterway 
 
Danube flows in Bulgaria and Romania for 471 and 1075 km respectively. Romania 
has the largest section of the Danube than any other country and Bulgaria comes 
fourth after Germany and Serbia and Montenegro. Moreover both of the Balkan 
countries lie in the area of the mouth of the river, which has vital strategical 
geopolitical and geo-economic importance. 
       3.2.4.3 Transport Corridor N    VIII 
         In antiquity, the Great Silk Road has been the shortest route between Europe 
and the Far East. It stretched for nearly 7000 km, starting from the northwestern 
provinces of China and finishing at the East Mediterranean. The Great Silk Road was 
in fact a trade route between Rome and China with mainly silk departing westward 
and wool, silver gold on the way back.141 However, after the fall of the Roman 
Empire and the Great Geographical Discoveries era in the later centuries, the 
significance of this route diminished and it was neglected for the centuries to come. 
During the communist era, the ancient Silk Road has been further completely blocked 
and such situation deformed the natural economical and cultural flows along this 
route. 
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         The continent-scale project TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-
Asia) is considered the modern ‘Eurasian renaissance of the [Great] Silk Road.’142 It 
was adopted on the Third Pan-European Transport Conference, held in Helsinki, 1997 
(although the first initiatives go back as 1993), as an implication of the new 
geopolitical understanding of Europe. Its main objective was to provide for new 
transport routes between Europe and Asia, as well as to integrate the Caucasus and 
Central Asian countries to the transport infrastructure of the EU. It should also 
promote political and economical sustainability as well as enhance cooperation 
between the countries along the corridor.  
         However the TRACECA corridor does not completely overlap with the ancient 
Silky Road, as it is shifted southward to circumvent the turbulent region of the Near 
and the Middle East (Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc). The slightly altered route would 
create a thousand km-long diagonal of Euro-Atlantic-values-committed countries, 
passing in-between the ‘risk region’ to the south and Russia to the north. 
         On the financial part, the EU and the initiative for technical assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) helped to attract IFIs, such as the 
World Bank (WB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have 
made commitments to provide more than EUR1.7 billion for the project.143 
TRACECA is planned to be fully operational by 2020.  
         At the conference in Helsinki, ‘It had been recognized that one of the 
weaknesses of the TRACECA route, in the context of the EU Tacis program, was the 
lack of linkage between the western end and the European market’144 Therefore it was 
decided that the TRACECA corridor would be integrated to the pan-European Trans-
European Networks (TENs) by a link on ‘corridors IV and VIII, via the port of Varna’ 
on the west Black Sea coast. Therefore, as Eric Cotte analyzed ‘the planned 
development projects on the European continent scheduled for the next 20 years 
depend on the building of corridors crossing the Balkans.’145 Furthermore the whole 
feasibility of the connection between Europe and Asia (TEN and TRACECA) on the 
revived Silk Road depends on the link through the Balkans and namely: port of Poti 
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[Georgia] in the Caucasus-port of Burgas [Bulgaria] on the Balkans, how it was 
initially adopted.    
         The part of the Great 
Silk Road that is passing 
through the Balkans is the 
so-called Corridor VIII, also 
adopted at the Helsinki, 
1997 conference. The route 
of pan-European multimodal 
Corridor VIII from 
Caucasus -Poti (Georgia) to 
the Italian 
Fig.12 Transport Corridor VIII and Via Egnatia 
 
 Port of Brindisi is planned to start in the Black Sea port of Burgas, pass through 
Dimitrovgrad and Sofia on Bulgarian territory, then pass through Skopje and Bitola in 
Macedonia and reach the Adriatic cost at Durrës in Albania. (See fig.2 below [red 
color]) 
         Furthermore, the corridor East-West (corridor VIII) was not only supported by 
the EU in the Crete (1993) conference but also by the US-government. In New York 
(1995), four Balkan Presidents (Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Turkey) in the 
presence of President Clinton announced the South Balkan Development Initiative 
(SBDI). ‘The SBDI is designed to help Albania, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia further 
develop and integrate their transportation infrastructure along the east-west corridor 
that connects them.’146 This project received the strong support by Washington and 
later was reconfirmed by the EU on the Helsinki conference as Corridor VIII was 
proclaimed the shortest and most efficient trade route between Europe and Asia, 
which is evidenced by the economical indicators below; 
 
The length of Corridor N8, defined on the basis of the now functioning road, is 995 km The 
mutual trade of countries within the Balkan segment is USD 13 420 million for 1997, and of 
those along the continuation of the Corridor towards Central Asia - USD 34 213 million, or 
                                                                                                                                                                      
145
 Ibid. 
146US Trade and Development Agency, ‘TDA Awards $4.3 Million in Transportation Grants In The 
South Balkans’, available at http://www.tda.gov/trade/press/dec9_98.html; Internet; accessed June, 
2003. 
 
 59 
totally along the whole length of the Corridor - USD 47 633 million. For most of the countries 
prognoses and trends indicate a GNP increase - in Bulgaria by 3% yearly, in Albania - 5%, 
Macedonia - 1-1,5%, Armenia - 5%, Azerbajan - 5-6%, Georgia - 10%, Kazakhstan - 2%, 
Kirghizstan - 6%, Tadjikistan - 3-5%, Turkmenistan - 2%, Uzbekistan - 2%. The expected ratio 
between local and transit traffic, as revealed by the macroeconomic indexes, is 1:3 - 1:5 in favor 
of the transit one. It is evident that the parameters and qualities of the already built and 
functioning transport infrastructure in the region, as compared to those of other transport routes 
from East to West, lag behind in creating competitive conditions for attracting traffic.147  
 
 
 
       3.2.4.4 Transport Corridor IX 
 
          As the ancient Via Militaris (coinciding with nowadays Corridor IV and X) 
links East and West through the Balkans, Corridor IX is planned to serve as a 
connection between North and South , thus transforming the Balkans (and mainly 
Bulgaria and Romania) into a transport knot with immense geopolitical and geo-
economic value for the enlarged European Union. ‘Corridor IX , the longest of the 
Pan European Transport Corridors from Finland (Helsinki) to Bulgaria and Greece, 
with a branch to Odessa, is a historic and important European Corridor traditionally 
serving high freight flows, in a north-south direction, serving both the Mediterranean 
and the Black Sea basin.’148 Trans-European Transport Corridor IX  starts from  
Helsinki  through Saint Petersburg  and  Moscow / Pskov , then  Kiev – Ljubasevka – 
Chisinau – Bucharest – Dimitrovgrad  and finishes in the Greek port of 
Alexandroupolis. As a part of the corridor, there are two branches: 
 
Fig.13 Transport Corridor IX 
 
- Kiev – Minsk – Vilnus – Caunas – 
Claipeda / Kaliningrad  
-Ljubasevka – Odessa 
After Bulgaria and Romania’s Accession in 
2007 this corridor will constitute the main 
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road artery between the Southeastern part of the EU and the neighbouring countries to 
the North-Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and also the shorthest connection between 
Northeastern and Southeastern parts of the union-from Baltic Sea to Black Sea. 
Therefore its role is expected to increase significantly, as well as the ammount of 
freight, people and goods transported through it.  
As a conclusion to the chapter the oil, gas, transport and nuclear projects, explored in 
detail above, allow us to conclude that ‘in any event, the Balkans, due mainly to the 
collapse of the USSR and the importance of the Caspian region, have risen in the 
1990s to become a key-geopolitical bridge between Western and Eastern Eurasia, 
between the West and the East.’149 
 
       
 
Conclusions: 
 
         The project’s goal was to look beyond the journalistic flash stories and the 
repetitive high-pathos-analysis of Eastern Enlargement of the EU into the Balkans and 
to explore in depth the geopolitical and geo-economic implications of such an 
important development for the whole region. In other words, this thesis looks at two 
major questions, and namely, what are the geopolitical and geo-economic 
consequences for the Balkans, arising from Bulgaria and Romania’s accession to 
the EU and in a broader context what are the geo-economic and geopolitical 
changes that are shaping in the Balkans in the first decade of the 21st century? To 
answer these broader questions   first, the answers of other closely related, but much 
more narrowly focused questions had to be found, namely: 
 
How the EU policies of inclusion and exclusion in the Balkans could contribute to severe 
economic, political and cultural ghettoization of the Balkans in short to mid term perspective?  
 
What are the Geo-economic and Geopolitical Perspectives for the integrated Eastern 
component? (Bulgaria and Romania) 
 
Pathways from the West Periphery or Western Periphery Paths: Options for the Excluded 
Component? (Bosnia& Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia & Montenegro, Macedonia) 
 
Are we currently observing grandeur changes and the emergence of Bulgaria and Romania as a 
region with a new very important geopolitical value due to the concurrence of major developments?  
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          How can these two countries capitalize on their advanced Euro-Atlantic integration stage and 
lobby for a more engaged EU policy towards the whole region and specifically the West Balkans? 
 
 
 
            The first chapter introduced broadly the political and economical framework 
in the Balkans in the fifteen years after the collapse of the old bi-polar geopolitical 
order. It explored how the region was split into two, as a consequence of major geo-
economic and geopolitical developments. By the year 2005, the Eastern part’ 
countries (Bulgaria and Romania) have progressed to an advanced Euro-Atlantic 
integration stage, while the Western ones were torn by a decade of fratricidal wars, 
and as a consequence, lagged significantly behind in their transition and integration 
processes. The second chapter explored the geo-economic implications of Bulgaria 
and Romania’s accession to the EU, both for the countries concerned (EU-included 
‘East’ part) and for the whole region (EU-excluded ‘West’ part). The third chapter 
looked at the geopolitical significance of the Eastern enlargement of the EU and the 
major oil, gas, transport and electricity projects, planned for commissioning through 
the Balkans. The analysis yielded the following results: 
        On the economic part: 
        The last couple of years have been marked by an expansionary boom in the 
economies of the two Balkan countries. This is even more pronounced when 
compared with the relative slowdown of the Central European countries’ economies. 
Bulgaria and Romania are experiencing record-high GDP growth rates, which reached 
in 2004, 5.6% and 8 %, respectively. However, this is not an isolated event as in the 
period 2001-2004 Romania grew with the impressive 5.88 % on average and Bulgaria 
with 4.75%. Such an impressive growth rate is coupled with record inflow of foreign 
direct investments in diverse sectors and a record of greenfield investments. As a 
support of that, ‘Bulgaria has brought in nearly $4.5 billion in FDI over the last 3 
years, which is a 50% increase over the period 1997-2001.’150  For 2004, Bulgaria and 
Romania alone received between 75 to 80 % of all the investment in Southeastern 
Europe and between 30 and 40 % of all the investment in Central and Eastern 
Europe.151 In figures that is projected by 2.6 billion US dollars of FDI for Bulgaria 
and 4.2 billion for Romania. After the accession is completed, Bulgaria and Romania 
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would be in the unique position of having the lowest labor costs in the EU. Moreover, 
this is a highly educated and skilled workforce. Such positive developments, coupled 
with relatively low inflation, and constantly falling unemployment, record low public 
debt/GDP ratio, etc. are started to be more and more acknowledged by policy makers 
and researchers of the region. Such positive economic development should be 
credited to the young reformist political elites of the two countries, but it is also 
largely linked to the already completed Atlantic integration and the clear perspective 
for EU- integration, scheduled for 2007. It is a truism that without the carrots ‘EU’ 
and ‘NATO’ most of the economic and political reforms would hardly ever be 
implemented. 
                  To summarize, it has been largely overlooked, but becoming more and more 
evident now that Bulgarian and Romanian economies outperformed CEC-4 
economies in terms of macroeconomic performance and expansionary growth and the 
tendency is very well pronounced and more and more strengthening. Again, it would 
not be an overstatement to claim that gradually the two Balkan countries are started to 
be regarded as regional economic powers. As argued, this is justified by numerous 
articles and publications in Western press and journals, as well as in the perception of 
the neighbors towards Bulgaria and Romania.  
         What does this emerging economic power might mean? Such a development is 
more than welcome for the two Balkan economies as this could lead to a convergence 
and catching-up of the latter with CEC-4’s economies in mid-term perspective. 
However, comparing to the Balkans, situation is much different, as such, a rapid and 
expansive growth of the EU-included Balkan component (Bulgaria and Romania) 
might create enormous discrepancies between the economic development of the latter 
and the excluded ‘economic/political component’ of the West Balkans. 
          These emerging discrepancies might lead to two types of development, largely 
due to the exclusion-inclusion policies of the European Union and other related 
institutions. Thus, in short to mid-term perspective, the Balkans will have an EU-
included eastern component-Bulgaria and Romania (who will geographically 
complete the EU by linking Hungary to Greece) and an EU-excluded component-the 
‘Wild West of the Balkans’. This EU policy will make economic cooperation in the 
Balkans even harder than that of the Cold War’s relations between COMECON 
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countries and the West. The most recent negative EU Constitution referenda results 
would most probably make the EU perspective for the Western Balkan countries even 
much more distant. However, this research argues that this would be a major mistake, 
as European Union’s policy of exclusion of the West Balkans, and the very near 
inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania might in short and mid-term perspective, create 
new economic and political ghettoes, on the boundaries of which could emerge two 
types of economic, political and cultural models. The relatively prosperous integrated 
Eastern part would become more and more alienated to the isolated Western- 
politically, economically and later even culturally, by creating heavy mental borders 
in Hozic’s terminology.  The result could be a severe economic, political and cultural 
ghettoization of the Balkans in short to mid term perspective. More EU policy makers 
have started to realize that the Western Balkans should not be isolated in some kind of 
a waiting room of an abandoned rail station, but rather incorporated. If such change of 
policy occurs and these countries are given timely and efficient real incentives for 
political and economic reform, rather than   intangible carrots and quite tangible 
sticks, the perspective might definitely be not so dim at least in the long-term. 
Furthermore, the west Balkan could capitalize on Bulgaria and Romania’s recent 
political success (EU and NATO integration) and economic boom. However, there is 
a high danger that the recent French and Dutch ‘No’ vote to the new EU Constitution 
might reverse this emerging positive attitude for the West Balkans and significantly 
delay their integration, which as argued above is the most unfortunate development 
for the region and the EU.  
           On the geopolitical part: 
           Broadly, if we are talking geopolitics in the post-Cold War era, we are talking 
oil and gas. Most of the recent research in geopolitics or political geography looks at 
the oil and gas reserves, their extraction and transportation. Therefore, to explore the 
emerging great geopolitical value of the Balkan region, I have regarded mainly oil 
and gas projects. This was complemented with research on transport projects, which 
often overlap with oil and gas projects to form multimodal transnational corridors. A 
small section was dedicated to nuclear projects with geopolitical importance in pre-
accession Bulgaria and Romania. The analysis yielded that the above-mentioned three 
newly formed geo-systems Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia would play main role 
of the oil and gas ‘big’ game of tomorrow. Namely, the Caucasus and Central Asia as 
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producers and the Balkans, as the major transport route for this assets from East to 
West and South to North. Standing on major crossroads, the Balkan geo-system 
acquires a new role of paramount geopolitical and geo-economic significance per se 
and specifically for the EU’s energy security policy. No matter the region does not 
have strategic reserves of its own, its emerging geo-strategic and geo-economic power 
‘resides in its geographical location, halfway between two major oil and gas supply 
regions - Russia and the Caspian - and large markets, such as Turkey, Southeast and 
Central Europe, and the Mediterranean.’ The region is not only blessed for its 
geography, but also relatively stable, compared to the Caucasus, Eastern Turkey and 
Iran, which are the competing routes for bringing the Caucasian and Central Asian 
gas to Western markets. Indeed, in comparison with the former alternatives, the 
Western Black Sea region, or in other words, the Eastern part of the Balkans 
(Bulgaria and Romania), offers the safest transit routes.  
             The need for construction of new pipelines is further exacerbated by the 
record growth and mid-term expansionary projection of oil and gas extraction in 
Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia coupled with the ever-increasing physical, 
geographical, ecological and political inefficiencies of the traditional route, the 
Bosporus Straits. 
           Those oil, gas, electricity and transport projects would dramatically increase 
the geopolitical value of the whole region and its importance to major political actors, 
such as EU and the US, as the Balkan region is gradually turning to major oil, gas and 
electricity hub of paramount geopolitical and geo-economic importance and a key-
link in the security of supplies puzzle. In Fouskas words, the Balkan zone constitutes 
a significant transport route for oil and gas, and it is thus a strategic bridge. In this 
context, the Balkans can be viewed as the geo-political gatekeeper between Western 
and Eastern Eurasia, acquiring a security dimension of paramount importance for 
NATO and the US. 
             Summarizing the geo-economic and geopolitical implications of Bulgaria and 
Romania’s EU accession for the region, and we can conclude that we are currently 
observing grandeur changes and the emergence of Bulgaria and Romania as a region 
with a new very important geopolitical value due to the concurrence of major 
developments. Namely these are- NATO integration (2004), combined with  EU 
accession (2007), expansionary economic boom in the last half decade, relocation of 
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couple of NATO military bases on the Western Black Sea coast (as the region is the 
closest to the Middle East and positioned best geographically and logistically to 
locate and counteract possible threats). To this should be added the two major 
Bosporus-bypass oil pipeline projects to be commissioned from Asia and the Middle 
East to the Adriatic, through the Balkans, and the Nabucco project from Middle East 
to Western Europe for gas transportation. Furthermore, six out of ten major pan-
European transport corridors, planned for commissioning, with the support of the EU 
pass through the Balkans. 
             However such economically and geopolitically rising East already creates 
mental, economical, political, cultural borders with the isolated West of the Balkans. 
In the last couple of years (but before the EU Constitution referenda), European 
policy makers have started to realize that the Wild Balkan West should not be treated 
as a disgraceful disease, but as a healthy part of our common European body. 
However, the recent negative Constitution referenda results from May, June 2005, 
would most certainly lead to a period of uncertainty, reluctance to enlargement and 
series of internal painful analysis and discussions. This would probably not influence 
Bulgaria and Romania, as they have already signed their accession treaties with the 
union. Nevertheless, for Croatia, Turkey and the countries of the West Balkans this 
can mean decades of waiting. If EU incorporates only the ‘good Balkan East’, and 
decides to further isolate and not give enough economic and especially political 
incentives to the ‘Wild West’ that could have long term negative consequences both 
for the region and for Europe, creating enormous mental, economical, political, 
cultural ghettoes in the very heart of the peninsula. In the positive case scenario, 
which is not very likely after May 2005, the Western Balkans could capitalize on 
Bulgaria and Romania’s advanced Euro-Atlantic stage and negotiation expertise for a 
quick negotiation process. In addition, they could rely on their lobby and support, as 
well as for changing the image of the whole region. The inclusion of the Western part 
in the political and economic dynamics of the East Balkans would even more increase 
the already significantly rising geo-economic and geopolitical weight of the whole 
region. A new region where Peace means blue skies, rather than Blue Helmets… 
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Appendices: 
 
A. Pan-European Transport Corridors in the Balkans: routes and maps 
 
Corridor IV 
Link EU-South-eastern Europe 
Road; rail; Danube ferry link; airports; ports; combined transport. Total length: 3.258 km 
 
Berlin 
Dresden 
Nuremberg 
Germany 
Prague 
Brno Czech Republic 
Vienna (rail) Austria 
Bratislava Slovak Republic 
Györ 
Budapest Hungary 
Arad 
Craiova 
Bucharest 
Romania 
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Constantza 
Sofia 
Plovdiv Bulgaria 
Thessaloniki Greece 
Omenio 
Istanbul Turkey 
 
Corridor VII 
Waterway route on the Danube from Germany to the Black Sea; connects up with the North Sea 
via the Rhine and the Main 
 
 
 Germany 
 
Austria 
Bratislava Slovak Republic 
Györ-Gönyü Hungary 
 
Croatia 
 
Serbia 
Ruse 
Lom Bulgaria 
 
Moldova 
 
Ukraine 
Constantza Romania 
 
Corridor VIII 
Road; rail; expansion of port of Durrës; combined transport in Bitola; Length: 1.300 km 
 
Durrës 
Tirana Albania 
Skopje 
Bitola FYR Macedonia 
Sofia 
Dimitrovgrad 
Burgas 
Varna 
Bulgaria 
 
Corridor IX 
Road; rail ; port expansion 
The Council in Essen (1994) declared the link Helsinki-St. Petersburg-Moscow as priority 
Total length: 6 500 km 
 68 
 
Helsinki Finland 
Vyborg 
St Petersburg 
Pskov 
Moscow 
Kaliningrad 
Russia 
Kiev 
Ljubasevka 
Odessa 
Ukraine 
Chisinau Moldova 
Bucharest Romania 
Vilnius 
Kaunas 
Klaipeda 
Lithuania 
Minsk Belarus 
Alexandroupolis Greece 
Dimitrovgrad 
Ormenio Bulgaria 
 
Corridor X 
Road; rail ; Length: 2 360 km 
 
Salsburg 
Graz Austria 
Zagreb Croatia 
Belgrade 
Nis 
 
Veles 
Thessaloniki 
 
Bitola 
Skopje FYR Macedonia 
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Ljubljiana 
Maribor Slovenia 
Budapest Hungary 
Belgrade Serbia 
Novi Sad 
 
Nis 
 
Sofia 
(Corr IV - Istanbul) 
Bulgaria 
Veles 
 
Florina 
Via Egnatia  
 
 
 
 
 
B. (Bosporus Bypass) Oil Pipeline Projects on the Balkans: technical data 
 
 
Name/Location Route 
Crude 
Capacity Length 
Estimated 
Cost/Invest
ment 
Status 
Albanian 
Macedonian 
Bulgarian Oil 
(AMBO) Pipeline 
Burgas (Bulgaria) 
via Macedonia to 
Vlore (Albania) on 
Adriatic coast 
750,000 bbl/d 
(could be 
expanded to 1-
million bbl/d) 
560 miles 
(898km) 
$850 million 
to $1.1 
billion 
Construction delayed, 
(proposed 2001-2002) as 
financing is arranged. As by 
2005, construction has not yet 
started. 
Burgas 
Alexandropoulis 
(Trans-Balkan Oil 
Pipeline) 
Burgas to 
Alexandropoulis 
(Greece) on the 
Aegean Sea coast 
Proposed 
600,000 bbl/d 
to 800,000 
bbl/d 
178 miles 
(280km) $600 million 
After 7 years of negotiations 
new agreement signed in 2002 
between Bulgaria, Greece, and 
Russia. As by 2005, 
construction has not yet started. 
Constanta-Trieste 
Pipeline 
Constanta 
(Romania) via 
Hungary, Slovenia, 
and/or Croatia to 
Trieste (Italy) on 
the Adriatic Sea 
coast. Omisalj 
(Croatia) also has 
been proposed as a 
terminus. 
660,000 bbl/d 855 miles (1300km) $900 million 
Feasibility studies completed; 
financing still to be arranged. 
Jan. 2003: agreement signed in 
Bucharest between Romania, 
Yugoslavia and Croatia. As by 
2005, construction has not yet 
started. 
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